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Abstract
The Moroccan nation-state is a taken-for-granted geopolitical entity that is represented 
by the Moroccan government and the core of the world system in ways that are 
consonant with their visions of reality. The primary goal of this thesis is to uncover the 
ideology and politics behind these visions of reality. Theories of critical geopolitics have 
been used to deconstruct Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara, its language policy, 
its economic policy, and its immigration situation. I have shown that the Moroccan 
government's views of its own nation-state are influenced by Arabo-Islamist ideology and 
that the core's perceptions of Morocco are influenced by colonial philosophy, 
modernization theory, and neoliberal thought. In these cases, geographical information 
that presents itself as objective is instead highly ideological and politicized. 
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Introduction
 “Geographic understanding requires an appreciation of how and why ideas 
have evolved and where they may be going” 
- Alex Murphy in Agnew, 2002
“The world political map of countries depicted in different colours is a thoroughly 
modern map. Our world of absolute political spaces, of clear-cut boundaries 
separating polities, is a phenomenon of the modern world-system and no other”  
- Peter Taylor, 1995 
The general goal of this thesis is to explore ideas that will lay the foundation for a 
future doctoral dissertation. Meanwhile, the specific goal of the thesis is to utilize an 
approach within political geography, called critical geopolitics, to examine four particular 
aspects of the Moroccan nation-state's role within its own boundaries. To get to that 
point, however, a broad range of ideas that address geographical perceptions need to be 
examined.
Surveying this broad range of ideas in the thesis is an ambitious undertaking. I 
cannot hope to cover any subject in great detail, but I will attempt to capture the essence 
of these subjects. This study will be based around Taylor's (1993: 44) model in which the 
world is divided into 3 scales – global, nation-state and local. No scale can be 
understood outside of the context of the other two scales. My specific goal focuses on 
the local scale, but this local scale cannot be understood outside of the context of the 
global and the nation-state scales. The inclusion of Taylor's three scale model is how the 
world system will be incorporated into this study.  
The theme driving my discussion is based on what Murphy expresses above. 
This thesis, being a product of geographical thought, seeks a geographical 
understanding for the ideas presented in it. This means trying to understand how ideas I 
address evolved and where they may be going. The starting point is the foundational 
1
idea of the nation-state. This must be examined because of the clash that exists 
between the “thoroughly modern map” that Taylor refers to in the quotation on page 1 
with something called Morocco on a political map, cleanly delineated and typically 
colored in blue or purple – and the reality of what Morocco means in a political 
geographical sense. As Taylor writes, clearly bounded political entities are a 
phenomenon of the contemporary “world-system and no other.” 
The vast majority of political research in the social sciences, including 
conventional political geography, takes a perspective that privileges the nation-state by 
treating it as a natural entity, without questioning its foundations. But it has become 
apparent in recent years that it is impossible to make progress in understanding the 
contemporary political-geographic order using approaches that privilege the nation-state. 
This is because of the multitude of social and economic processes that take place 
without the nation state's involvement, particularly in relation to globalization (Agnew, 
1994). 
Some argue that the process of globalization is rendering nation-state boundaries 
unimportant and creating a “placeless” world.  This perspective is often criticized 
because the process of globalization does not happen evenly over the entire surface of 
the world, nor does it affect all places in the same way. It is also argued that the nation-
state still retains much power (Dicken, 2000: 315). A third perspective has arisen, 
advocated by some political geographers, that attempts to find a middle ground between 
the nation-state centered perspective and the globalized perspective (O'Tuathail, 1998; 
Agnew, 1994). In this thesis, I will argue for the strengths of this latter school of thought. 
Modernization theory, neoliberal thought and the idea of development have had a 
great amount influence on the way in which the contemporary world is perceived as well 
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as how the developed world interacts with the undeveloped world (Peet, 1999). These 
ideas are largely drawn from colonial philosophies (Peet and Watts, 1993). It is important 
to understand that the Moroccan nation-state is largely a construction of French (and to 
a lesser degree Spanish) colonialism, and therefore, without having a grasp of Moroccan 
colonial geography or history, it is impossible to examine the contemporary Moroccan 
nation-state or the relationship it has with the developed world. 
Conventional geopolitical reasoning is what has defined the concepts that will be 
examined in this thesis. This reasoning works through the active suppression of complex 
geographical realities in favor of controllable geographical abstractions (O Tuathail and 
Agnew, 1992: 82). In order to see past perspectives that conventional geopolitical 
reasoning has created, I will use an approach called critical geopolitics. Critical 
geopolitics investigates the ways in which conventional geopolitical forms of reasoning 
have interpreted the world political map (Dodds, 2003: 207). Throughout this thesis, I will 
ask questions about how taken-for-granted geopolitical entities are constructed in the 
first place, and how it may be possible to imagine different geopolitical arrangements 
(Dalby, 1998: 312). 
This thesis is largely an examination of theories and concepts. Therefore, my 
methods consist largely of a critical reading of political geography theory and secondary 
literature on Morocco. As Myers (2008) argues “Theory should enable research, not the 
other way around”. Theories help to define what needs to be studied. This thesis is part 
of the process in helping me to define what needs to be addressed in my future 
dissertation research – which will be a fieldwork-based critical geopolitics dissertation on 
Morocco. 
In a world in which the nation-state's role is not exactly clear, it is important to 
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understand that a nation-state does not have a monopoly on power within its own 
territorial boundaries. I am using the ideas of reterritorialization and deterritorialization 
as ways to understand how Morocco's sovereignty is still intact in some ways, but has 
been compromised in others. Since the beginning of formal decolonization in Morocco 
in 1956, Morocco has reterritorialized itself through the militarized occupation of Western 
Sahara and language policy. Starting in about the mid-1980s, Morocco no longer had 
monopolistic control over its economic policy and immigration situation, largely due to 
policies implemented by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the European 
Union. It can be said that these two processes have been deterritorialized. 
The way in which these four situations have been portrayed through conventional 
geopolitical reasoning are not objective realities (O Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 79). 
Rather they are highly ideological and deeply politicized ways of viewing the world. My 
goal, through the application of critical geopolitics is to show that the Moroccan 
occupation of Western Sahara, Moroccan language policy, economic policy and 
Morocco's immigration situation are not always objective geographical facts. 
4
Chapter 1
The Sovereign State Ideal
At present, the world geographical order is dominated by one ideal, that of the 
sovereign state. The essence of this is that national governments hold absolute and final 
power within their own boundaries. The concept has come to dominate so completely in 
the contemporary world that it is rarely questioned. Murphy (1996: 103) writes:
Discussions of matters as diverse as population growth, environmental changes, 
and trade focus attention on similarities and differences among and between 
states. In the process, it becomes increasingly difficult to think in terms of a 
geographic order that is not state-based.....The tendency to conceptualize social, 
cultural, economic and even environmental processes in state terms would seem 
to demand some sort of critical scrutiny. Yet the modern territorial order pervades 
so much of our lives that we rarely even think about its role in shaping our 
spatial imaginations.
Is there a problem with viewing the world in this manner, not questioning a 
geographic order based on the sovereign state ideal? It is the most obvious way of 
understanding the world at the present time, but, as Dalby (2008) notes, “what is most 
obvious in how we understand the world isn't necessarily the only way things can be 
understood”. This idea is not Dalby's alone. Recently, scholars have begun to question 
the sovereign state ideal and the perceived geographic order based on it. The primary 
critique leveled against the sovereign state ideal is that it fails to capture a world where 
important aspects of social, economic, and political processes occur outside of the 
sovereign state (Agnew, 1994: 77; Penrose and Mole, 2008: 272; Sassen, 2002: 66; 
Smith, 2000: 767). 
In order to understand the world more completely, we must demonstrate that it is 
possible to break free of the sovereign-state based geographic order (Agnew, 1994: 55; 
Sassen, 2000: 66). But before we get to that point, it is necessary to summarize the how 
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the geographical order based on the sovereign state ideal has become so pervasive. 
Writers on the subject of the sovereign state ideal agree that the Treaty of 
Westphalia, signed in what is now Germany by emergent European nation-states in 
1648, formalized the concept (Taylor, 2000a: 766; Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 284; 
Murphy, 1996: 82, Agnew and Kuus, 2008: 96). Taylor sums up the treaty, writing 
“....state centralization was accepted through the principle of noninterference in each 
other's affairs” (1994: 153). In other words, the Treaty of Westphalia created a situation 
in which states formally agreed not to interfere in each others' internal matters. 
The Treaty was an important part of a process in which national governments 
began taking monopolistic control of authority within their fixed national boundaries. 
Slater (2004: 177) breaks down sovereignty into three components. First is the 
construction and maintenance of a geopolitical frontier of a society. This includes both 
the demarcation of physical boundaries as well social boundaries as they define a 
national identity. The second is the construction of legal and institutional systems. The 
third is the preservation of internal order. The second and third components both serve 
to reify the structure created by the first component. From a cultural standpoint, Murphy 
(1996: 82) argues that the Treaty of Westphalia contributed to a world view in west-
central Europe in which distinct and independent territorial units were seen as the 
principal building blocks of social and political life everywhere. This process has had a 
profound effect on the contemporary world. European colonialism was largely 
responsible for spreading this world view to other parts of the globe. 
The sovereign state ideal, in its contemporary form, has joined the idea of nation 
to state. Murphy (1996: 104) argues that the word nation refers to a group of culturally 
homogenous people while state refers to a territorial sovereign state, which is based on 
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the sovereign state ideal. Smith writes that the term nation-state implies that only one 
cultural identity exists within state boundaries and this cultural identity is congruent with 
state boundaries (2000: 534, 535). Keep in mind that this viewpoint is an ideal, but rarely 
true in practice (Agnew, 1994).  
The joining of cultural identity to the state (after which it becomes a nation-state) 
has given the state control of the identity of its inhabitants. This is only one aspect of 
what the state controls, or practices sovereignty over within its own boundaries. Taylor 
(1994: 157) writes:
The nation-state of the twentieth century......has become the great container of 
activities, first capturing politics, then economics, followed by cultural identity and 
finally the idea of society itself. This fusing of polity, economy, nation and society 
has produced the most powerful of all institutions of our times, so powerful in fact 
           that for much of modern discourse it masquerades as a natural phenomenon 
rather than the historical creation that it is. 
It seems that the processes that have allowed the nation-state system to 
dominate the contemporary geographic order would warrant further investigation. But an 
exhaustive geographical and historical survey of the nation-state would only serve to 
distract from the goal of understanding the world outside of the sovereign state ideal. 
Rather, the important point is to understand that the nation-state is not the “natural” order 
of human society - it has become ubiquitous due to geographical and historical factors. 
Quite simply, the world does not consist of one or two hundred contiguous nations 
waiting for states to put boundaries around them. Every nation state is a particular 
political construction, very few of which are even close to being culturally homogenous 
(Taylor, 1993: 6).
Also, keep in mind that the goal of this section is not to suggest a different 
geographical order outside of the nation-state system, nor to criticize the nation-state 
system and expose its shortcomings. It is to explore perspectives that allows us to 
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understand the contemporary geographical order more thoroughly. This is based on 
Agnew's (1994: 77) and Taylor's (1993: 45) statements which argue that world views that 
make their starting point the sovereign state ideal fail to capture a world where aspects 
of social, economic, and political life occur outside of it. In response to these criticisms, 
there are some widely known efforts that attempt to move past the sovereign state ideal. 
It is the goal of the next chapter to explain these. 
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Chapter 2 
Academic Perspectives on the Contemporary World
There are three perspectives in academic research which attempt to understand 
the contemporary geographic order. The first, and by far the most prevalent, is the 
nation-state centered perspective, which was discussed in the previous chapter (Agnew 
1994; Taylor 2000a: 767; Biersteker 2002: 62; O'Tuathail: 90; Sassen 2000: 73). The 
second is the globalized perspective, which takes the position that the process of 
globalization has made nation-state boundaries meaningless (Taylor 2000a: 767, 
O'Tuathail: 90). The third perspective, which will be called the third perspective for lack 
of a better term, involves an attempt to take the middle ground between the nation-state 
centered perspective and the globalized perspective. 
The state-centered perspective is still the dominant way of understanding the 
contemporary geographic order, and there is a very good reason for this. Taking the 
views of Murphy (1996: 103) and Taylor (1994: 157), the nation-state has become the 
most powerful institution of contemporary times, and as a result it has become difficult to 
think in terms of a world geographic order that is not nation-state centered. 
Agnew (1995: 78), sees an artificial intellectual divide in political studies that has 
resulted from viewing the world geographic order as entirely nation-state based. Political 
science's wing that is termed “comparative politics” has concerned itself with “domestic” 
issues, or issues that occur only within nation-state boundaries. Everything that occurs 
outside these boundaries has been relegated to international relations. International 
relations, like the majority of political science, holds the view that nation-states represent 
the highest level of political authority (Painter, 2008: 58).  Most political geography 
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concerns itself with domestic issues, much like comparative politics in political science, 
and leaves issues considered to be outside of state boundaries to international relations 
(Taylor, 1994: 157)
Contrasting with the state-centered perspective, one finds the globalized 
perspective, in which the processes of globalization play the primary role. Newman 
(1999: 6) argues that this perspective takes the position that the sovereign-state ideal is 
becoming a political and territorial feature of the past. World economic integration and 
the spread of communication technologies are seen as being the primary factors in 
bringing about the end of nation-state sovereignty and its associated elimination of 
boundaries. It is asserted that nation-states are no longer significant political actors or 
meaningful economic units. Proponents of the globalized perspective have declared that 
the “end of geography” has arrived and everywhere is becoming the same (Dicken, 
2000: 315). 
Taylor (1995: 10), in critiquing the globalized perspective argues that “the modern 
world-system and its many institutions are essentially dynamic in nature. Hence what 
modern states do and why are continually changing.....How can we ever know whether 
the changes in the state are the usual adaptation to an ever-changing system or if they 
point towards a genuine dissolution of the state”? This statement catches the essence of 
what many political geographers are trying to get at. The argument of whether the 
nation-state is still the center of power or whether the nation-state has become irrelevant 
is inconsequential. What is relevant is finding ways to understand the contemporary 
geographic order that break free of narratives that adhere strictly to either the state-
centered perspective or the globalized perspective (Agnew, 1994: 77; Dalby, 2008: 452; 
O'Tuathail, 1998: 90; Mole and Penrose, 2008: 271; Cox, Low and Robinson: 2008: 1). 
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Taylor (1995: 2) argues, “......the reason we seem not to be able to theorize states 
adequately in their multiplicity is because we do not have the necessary conceptual tools 
for the task. The language we are trying to use has a political lexicon derived through 
and moulded by state-centered politics”. The third perspective attempts to address 
Taylor's critique. 
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Chapter 3
The Third Perspective: Alternative Ways of Understanding the World  
Murphy (1996: 110), evaluating both the nation-state centered perspective and 
the globalized perspective, writes “to conclude......that we are indefinitely imprisoned 
within the current political-territorial order, however, is as dubious as to assume that 
territory and politics are about to be entirely uncoupled.” In other words, the nation-state 
continues to be a center of power, but processes operating on different scales outside of 
the nation-state system, i.e. globalization, have never allowed the sovereign state ideal 
to be realized. This leads us toward the balanced, in-between place of the third 
perspective. 
The third perspective is not one view, but rather a number views that have 
evolved in reaction to a complex world geographic order.  O Tuathail (1998: 88), writing 
on the third perspective, argues that it is the task of political geographers to understand 
complex geographies that are present in the contemporary world. The problem with 
world views that utilize singular narratives of the absolute sovereignty of the state (the 
nation-state centered perspective) or a borderless world created by globalization (the 
globalized perspective) is that these perspectives fail to capture to the complexity of the 
contemporary geographic order.  
Multiple ways have been devised to understand the world outside of the nation-
state system. Four different perspectives will be surveyed: the Third World/First World 
Divide, dependency theory and the core-periphery model, world systems analysis, and 
the world cities hypothesis. These perspectives at their essence are studies of social 
change. Commenting on this, Taylor (2000: 902) writes, “......any meaningful study of 
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social change cannot proceed country by country, but must incorporate the whole world 
system. This is the single-society assumption which replaces the multiple-society 
assumption of most social science.” This statement would seem to make the previously 
described globalized perspective valid. However, Taylor (1995: 9), in an earlier writing, 
reminds us that the globalized perspective fails to incorporate the continued relevance of 
the nation-state: “we live in a single global system but one divided into multiple 
territories”. 
The four perspectives that will be discussed in the following pages are by no 
means perfect and have had critiques leveled at them, just like the nation-state 
perspective and the globalized perspective. All four serve to reify the nation-state in 
some manner. There are other perspectives that attempt to see the world outside the 
nation-state geographic order besides what is presented in the following pages. The 
reason that these four specific perspectives have been chosen is that they can be 
presented in a way in which one builds upon the ideas of another. This is useful for me in 
my own understanding and it allows the discussion to have some continuity, rather than 
jumping from one disparate concept to another. These perspectives, regardless of their 
shortcomings, have created a useful vocabulary, which I will utilize throughout this 
thesis. 
3.1) Third World/First World Divide
Even though the Third World/First World divide has been seriously questioned 
due to difficulties in categorizing nation-states of the world into one of two categories 
(Agnew, 1995: 70-77), it warrants an explanation for two reasons: 1) without a firm grasp 
of this idea, it is impossible to understand the three other perspectives discussed in this 
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section and 2) it still enjoys widespread use in both popular and academic dialogue, and 
therefore it is still important. 
Lee writes that the term Third World, when it was coined, had a much different 
meaning than it does presently. It was first used to describe the global geopolitical order 
of the Cold War. In contrast, it presently denotes a group of nation-states that are 
considered to be “underdeveloped” (2000). The term Third World originated with French 
social scientists during the 1950s to characterize nation-states that were reluctant to 
choose sides in the Cold War. The two sides were referred to as the First World and the 
Second World. (Lee, 2008: 827). The term, in part, is derived from the idea of the “Third 
Way”. The Oxford American Dictionary (2005: 1754) defines it as “an option regarded as 
an alternative to two extremes, especially a political agenda that is centrist and 
consensus-based rather than left- or right- wing”. Using this reasoning, the First World 
and Second World refers to two opposite modes of economic and social development. 
The First World, referred to capitalist economic and democratic political systems, and 
the Second World, then referred to communist economic and authoritarian political 
systems. The United States and its wealthy allies became known as the “First World” 
and the Soviet Union and its allies became known as the “Second World”. 
The meaning of the term “Third World” gradually came to define 
“underdeveloped” countries in general. According to Agnew (1995: 71), within Cold War 
geopolitical thought, there were two paths to “modernization” and “development” 
(Chapter 4 discusses development and modernization theory in more detail). The first 
was aligning with the First World and choosing American/European modes of 
development. The second was aligning with the Second World and choosing Soviet 
modes of development. 
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Nation-states that did not align with the First or Second World were relegated to a 
path of non-development, which placed them in the underdeveloped and therefore a 
Third World that was not part of the modern world. Figure 1 illustrates this idea. Keep in 
mind that this idea was an extreme interpretation of Cold War geopolitics and was a 
perspective taken by United States foreign policy and politically powerful individuals who 
helped to form and reify it, such as Henry Kissinger (Agnew 1995: 72). 
A counter-current to this rigid ideology arose with the non-aligned movement in 
the mid-1950s, with India, Egypt and Yugoslavia taking the lead. A non-aligned 
movement conference was convened in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, with both 
communist and pro-Western states in attendance. The main goal of this conference was 
to consolidate global support for nation-states that sought to remain independent from 
both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Taylor, 1993: 101). 
The reason why the non-aligned movement was important was that it demonstrated that 
the division of the world into three different spheres by US foreign policy was a simplified 
perspective on the world and was created for political reasons.  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Second World essentially 
ceased to exist. What exists presently, some scholars argue, are two spheres, the 
undeveloped Third World and the developed First World (Drakakis-Smith, 2000: 67). The 
term no longer denotes political alignment, but rather levels of social and economic 
development. 
Agnew (1995: 167-168), writes that in the 50 years that have passed since this 
classification of countries into distinct “Worlds”, the Third World/First World divide has 
lost its validity – if such a simplistic view ever was valid. Cities and certain regions in 
countries like India, Brazil and Nigeria are as much as part of the First World as they are 
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of the Third World (King, 1990).  In other words, it is difficult to conclude if a particular 
nation-state falls in to the First World or the Third World because levels of social and 
economic development are rarely even within nation-states. According to Lee (2000: 
828), the Third World/First World divide leads to a dichotomy which relegates places in 
the world to “modern” or “not-modern”. This rationalizes the imposition of political, social 
and economic policies from the First World to the Third World, which detractors see as a 
form of subjugation and/or neocolonialism. Also, the Third World/First World divide 
serves to reify the nation-state. Nation-states are simply placed in one of two categories. 
Despite these shortcomings, the vocabulary and concepts introduced by the 
Third World/First World divide is useful in the discussion of theories that utilize this 
dichotomy. I will use the vocabulary of Third World/First World divide throughout this 
thesis. Out of shortcomings of the Third World/First World divide, several alternative 
perspectives for viewing the world geographic order have arisen. 
3.2) Dependency Theory and the Core-Periphery Model
Taylor (1993: 328) defines a dependency as “an economic or political relationship 
between countries or groups of countries in which one side is not able to control its 
destiny because of oppressive links with the other side.” Tying this concept into the 
concept of the Third World, dependency theory holds that the underdevelopment of the 
Third World is due mainly to forces outside of Third World nation-states' boundaries, 
rather than local failure (Watts, 2000: 164). 
The core-periphery model is a model of the geography of human activity based 
upon the unequal distribution of power in economics and society. It holds that the core 
dominates, while the periphery is dependent (Lee, 2000: 115). The periphery supplies 
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low-value commodities to the core in exchange for high-value manufactured goods. This 
creates a relationship in which the periphery is dependent upon and dominated by the 
core. Colonialism and neocolonialism are seen as the primary factors that have led to 
the development of such relationships (Watts, 2000: 164), which suggests that core-
periphery relationships are not the “natural” world order, but are the results of 
geographical and historical processes. This idea relates to Lee's statement, “Cores and 
peripheries are social products and reflect the circumstances of their construction” 
(2000: 117).
Dependency theory and the core-periphery model were brought to maturity by 
theorists during the mid to late 1960s most notably, by Cardoso, Falleto, and Frank 
examining economic situations in Latin America (Blömstrom and Hettne, 1984: 62, 67). It 
is argued that systems of dependence result from relationships of exploitation, which 
have their starting point at the interpersonal scale. A simplified model explains that 
peasants are exploited by land-owning farmers who do not pay them full price for 
commodities they produce. In turn, land-owning farmers then sell the commodities to 
merchants at higher prices, thus generating a profit. This sequence of exploitative trade 
continues until the sums of the profit generated (surplus) are taken out of the periphery 
(Latin America) and transferred to the core (Europe) (Frank, 1967; Willis, 2005: 71). 
Figure 2 illustrates this idea. This model explains how a capitalist world economic 
system could promote development in the core, leaving the periphery undeveloped and 
in turn dependent upon the core (Blömstrom and Hettne, 1984: 66). Dependency theory 
argues that disparities between center and periphery are reproduced through 
international trade as well as arguing that the colonial origins of peripheral economies 
into the world capitalist system has led to the creation of economies based on the export 
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of primary products only (Slater, 2004: 119). Dependency theory and the core-periphery 
model influenced policies of national development from the 1950s until the mid 1970s 
(Willis, 2003: 67). 
One of the main goals of these development policies was to “delink” national 
economies from the exploitative core (Power, 2003: 81, So, 1990: 91). Brazil, for 
example, pursued a policy called Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). This policy 
sought to reduce imports through protective tariffs and encouraged domestic 
manufacturing through subsidies. This policy resulted in a 12 percent annual growth in 
manufacturing within Brazil from 1965 to 1972. However the effectiveness of these 
policies came into question when it was realized that the domestic market in Brazil would 
be unable to continue to absorb all the manufactured goods being produced. Also if the 
surplus manufactured goods were to be exported, they would have a difficult time 
competing in the global economy without large government subsidies (Willis, 2003: 67).  
The core-periphery model and dependency theory have a number criticisms 
leveled against them; for the sake of brevity I will summarize a primary one. They take a 
static view of the world in which the core and periphery are destined to remain fixed over 
time, with core perpetually exploiting the periphery. This perspective stated that the only 
way that core-periphery relationships could change was through a drastic restructuring 
of the world economic system. This viewpoint comes from a Marxist perspective which 
argues that it is the inherent nature of a capitalist world economy to lead to uneven 
development (Smith, 1984). However, this assumption was challenged during the 1970s, 
when states in East Asia, like Singapore and Taiwan, experienced rapid economic 
growth, and showed signs of moving well out of the periphery, without any major 
structural changes in the world economy (Taylor, 1993: 19; Willis: 2004: 72, 73). 
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Not only do cores and peripheries exist between countries at the nation-state 
scale, they can exist within nation-state boundaries, due to levels of uneven 
development within nation-states (Power, 2003: 82; Willis, 2004: 75). Friedmann (1965: 
57-64; 1966: 10-14, 41-44), identifies a core-periphery structure within Venezuela. The 
core and periphery are linked by a development corridor whose economic growth is 
dependent upon demands placed upon it by the core. At the edge of the periphery exists 
a resource frontier in which territory is integrated into the national economy through the 
exploitation of natural resources. In this case Caracas, the capital, acted as the core and 
was accumulating a large portion of the country's wealth and population. The core fueled 
its growth by draining the periphery of its capital, labor and raw materials. Friedmann's 
application of the core-periphery model attempts to move beyond a simple binary model 
by defining further subdivisions. In this way, it is similar to World Systems Analysis, 
which is the subject of the next section.  
3.3) World Systems Analysis
World systems analysis (WSA) is an approach that has been in continuous 
development by the sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein and his followers since 1974. It 
strives to transcend political theory's tendency of nation-state centrism common to all 
social sciences. Wallerstein's starting point for WSA was to determine the primary social 
unit in which social change was taking place, rather than taking the nation-state for 
granted (Taylor, 2003: 50). In other words, this approach tries to understand the world 
geographic order outside of the nation-state system more firmly than dependency theory 
and the core-periphery model. 
From a perspective of political geography, Taylor writes that WSA allows political 
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geography to span the artificial intellectual divide that separates the disciplines of 
political science (studying domestic politics) and international relations (studying 
international politics) (2003: 54). Since most political geography has starting points 
similar to most political science, it is guilty of taking the nation-state for granted, just like 
political science. This point of Taylor's is mentioned not because this thesis will be a 
study that extensively uses WSA, but rather to point out a major criticism of studies of 
political geography that use the nation-state as their starting point. This thesis attempts 
to use an approach that recognizes this criticism of conventional political geography, 
which will be addressed in the section of the thesis that discusses critical geopolitics. 
WSA has added the category of semi-periphery to the categories core and 
periphery of the core-periphery model, while retaining the ideas of exploiter and 
exploited, see Figure 3. Unequal exchange in commerce is imposed by the strong core 
upon the weak peripheries, and this is the means by which the surplus of the world 
economy is appropriated (Peet, 1999: 113, 114)  Addressing a major criticism of 
dependency theory and the core-periphery model, WSA holds that the core and the 
periphery are not static, but rather places move up and down between them through the 
semi-periphery (Taylor, 2000: 903). Currently there are three centers of the core in the 
world: North America, West and Central Europe and Japan. Places in the semi-periphery 
include Brazil and Mexico. With a few exceptions, the continent of Africa is located 
entirely within the periphery (Friedmann, 1986: 73; Willis 2003: 72). See Figure 4 for 
further illustration. Core states are administratively organized and militarily powerful, 
while peripheral states have the opposite characteristics. The semi-periphery combines 
elements of both (Peet, 2004: 113). To quickly compare the Third World/First World 
divide to WSA, it is argued that WSA never interpreted the Soviet Union and its sphere 
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of influence as an alternate Second World to the First World. It was seen as a strategy 
from the semi-periphery to restructure the world-economy (Taylor, 2003: 55). The world 
system (and its parts of the core, semi-periphery and periphery) evolve through stages 
of alternating expansion and contraction known as Kontradieff cycles. Within this 
framework, it is argued that a comparative analysis of the entire system and the 
development of its parts can be made (Peet: 1999: 114; Wallerstein, 2000b) 
One criticism of WSA is that it takes a broad historical perspective on world 
systems. This perspective, because it is so broad, makes theories derived from WSA 
that are impossible to test (Willis, 2004: 75). Even though WSA does have shortcomings, 
it introduces a vocabulary that is the most appropriate for describing the world in this 
thesis. 
3.4) World Cities Hypothesis
The borders of a nation-state can be equated to a container of four things: power, 
wealth, culture and society (Taylor 1994: 152). According to the sovereign state ideal, a 
nation-state has absolute control over power, wealth, culture and society within its own 
boundaries. While Taylor understands that no nation-state has absolute sovereignty 
within its own boundaries, the power that nation-states do have (which remains rather 
considerable) is “leaking” from the container due to the growing power of multinational 
corporations. This line of reasoning leads to the question. “Where is power beginning to 
concentrate?” One answer to this question are economically powerful cities that are well-
connected to each other, known as “world cities” (2000c).
Friedmann, a key thinker behind the world cities hypothesis (1986: 69), writes 
that this hypothesis views cities not solely as products of local conditions, but rather as 
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products that result from processes set in motion by the capitalist world-economic 
system. Viewing cities in this manner allows insight into the processes of urban change, 
but more importantly for this thesis, it offers a spatial perspective on a world economy 
that is increasingly heedless to nation-state boundaries. The main goal of the world cities 
hypothesis is to link urbanization processes with global economic forces. 
 Murphy argues that “in some respects the connections between New York, 
London and Tokyo are more extensive than the connections between any of these cities 
and the more distant parts of their national hinterlands” (1996: 107). Taylor stresses it is 
how these cities interact with each other through networks which defines their place in 
the world. In other words, cities that appear in Figure 5 are important because of their 
interactions with other world cities, not because of service to hinterlands (2004: 8). 
While criticizing the world cities literature, Robinson (2002: 159) nonetheless 
writes that the world's economy has come to reside in clusters of economic activity, 
which are located in key urban centers, such as London and New York. Headquarters of 
major transnational corporations, along with service providers such as finance houses, 
have concentrated in these key urban centers in order to manage their complex global 
operations. Friedmann (1986: 69) writes that while the overall context of city 
classification is important, it is the economic factor which is decisive for all attempts at 
explanation. This focus on the economic factor is the central point of Robinson's criticism 
of a world cities theorization. A city that is relegated to the periphery in the world-cities 
hypothesis is taken “off the map” while cities located in the core and semi-periphery are 
seen as the sites where major global change is taking place (Robinson 2002: 539). 
Friedmann (1996) himself writes that large swaths of the world's area and the majority of 
its population are left out of the world cities hypothesis. I see Robinson's argument as 
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reminiscent of criticisms of the Third World/First World divide and dependency theory 
and core-periphery model because in the end, they all still divide the world into two 
distinct “developed” and “undeveloped” spheres. The developed sphere is the object of 
study, while the undeveloped sphere (which is the majority of the world's people and 
land surface) is disregarded. 
The important point to take from the world-cities hypothesis is that it is yet 
another way to theorize beyond the nation-state. In providing these four examples, I 
hope to demonstrate that it is necessary to theorize beyond the sovereign-state ideal, 
but at the same time showing that it is not an easy task.   
3.5) Summary
So what lesson can be extracted from the fixation on the sovereign state ideal, 
and critiques of this fixation? Until now, my discussion has centered around very abstract 
ideas. But, without understanding that the contemporary geographic order is made up of 
more than just a collection of nation-states, it is impossible to make any progress in 
understanding it. Agnew (1994: 77) argues that the critical theoretical issue is the 
geographical and historical relationship between nation-states and broader social 
structures, economic structures and the geopolitical order in which nation-states must 
operate. The perspectives described in this section attempt to make sense of broader 
social and economic structures as well as the geopolitical order created by them. 
To summarize the discussion so far, when examining a nation-state, it is not 
enough to ascribe the sovereign state ideal to it. As common-sensical as it may sound, 
the context of how a particular nation-state has come into being as a recognized 
political-territorial entity must be understood before understanding the nation-state itself. 
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Nation-states are not equal players on a level playing field. A particular nation-state's 
internal issues and its place or places in the world-system derive from a complex 
interaction of past and present factors from both inside and outside of its boundaries. 
Processes like colonialism and neo-colonialism, which are largely responsible for 
shaping the present world system (Watts, 2000: 93, 95), do still matter. The constant and 
necessary core-periphery structure of the capitalist world economy requires imperialism 
to be a continual political project (Flint and Taylor, 2007: 81). 
The main point to take from this section is that processes that shape the world 
are incredibly complex. The four perspectives described in this section cannot hope to 
find a universal truth about the world geographic order. Regardless of their limits, they 
are all still useful to me in this thesis. The vocabulary that they have invented makes 
discussion about the world outside of the nation-state ideal possible. I will utilize the 
concepts in the next chapter in order to discuss development, modernization theory, and 
neoliberalism, which are key concepts used in this thesis. One common factor that links 
the four different perspectives together is that they attempt to measure levels of 
development, which is my first theme in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
Modernization Theory and Neoliberalism
4.1) Development
 While “development” is a foundational principle of the contemporary world, its 
meanings in relation to society are poorly defined or obtuse. Development, as it is often 
seen, is a process in which all modern advances in science, technology, democracy, 
values, ethics and social organization coalesce into the single humanitarian project of 
producing a better world (Peet, 1999: 1). Keep in mind that this thesis is not about the 
development of a particular place or finding the means to produce a better world. It is 
about geographical perceptions and how these perceptions have come into being. The 
idea of a developed place versus an undeveloped place is a way of understanding 
geography. It may seem backwards that I discuss ways of ordering the world based 
upon levels of development and then discussing the concept of development and 
theories based upon it. But it was necessary to establish a vocabulary given by the Third 
Perspective that broke free of the conventional nation-state based geographical order. 
The concept of development is often linked with modernity. Modernity has been 
used as a term to describe a particular form of economy and society based upon 
essentialized notions of Western European experiences. Modernity encompasses 
industrialization, urbanization, and the increased use of “technology” within economic, 
social and cultural spheres of society. It is characterized by rational and scientific 
approaches to understanding the world and progress. This is in direct contrast to other 
understandings of the world that are purportedly rooted in religious explanations (Willis, 
2005: 3). The West became the prototype as the measure of social progress (Slater, 
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1995: 65). 
In capitalist societies, development is conventionally measured in terms based 
exclusively on the size of the economy. This is called Gross National Product (GNP) 
which is defined as the “total final output of goods and services produced by an 
economy” (World Bank, 1989: 291). Most often, the higher GNP/capita (per capita 
income), the more developed a country or region is said to be. Economic growth is 
traditionally measured in terms of an increase in the total size of an economy. The higher 
the annual growth of GNP/capita, the more rapidly a country is considered to develop. 
The use of wealth as a measure of development is considered appropriate because it is 
assumed that greater wealth is associated with benefits such as improved health, 
education and quality of life (Peet, 1999: 4; Willis, 2005: 3). It is from these ideas of 
modernity and development that modernization theory and neoliberal thought have 
arisen. 
4.2) Modernization Theory
I will now turn the discussion to the idea of modernization theory. An explanation 
of modernization theory is critical to understanding colonialism and Morocco in Chapter 
5 and the use of critical geopolitics in Chapter 7. Modernization theory starts with the 
assumption of a dichotomy between two ideals: the traditional society and the modern 
society. Traditional societies are supposed to follow the same pattern of change 
experienced earlier by modern societies. This pattern was most famously articulated by 
Rostow1. The goal of modernization theory is to identify social factors in the organization 
1 Rostow's stages of economic development occupied a leading position in development discourse during 
the 1960s (Peet, 1999: 83). It was argued by Rostow (1960) that all societies lay in five stages of 
economic development, which are: 
1) Traditional societies which are marked by primitive technology and spiritual attitudes that limited 
economies to the agricultural level.
2) Pre-conditions for take-off are established when insights of modern science are translated into greater 
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and history of modern societies whose change was instrumental in the process of 
development (Larain, 1989: 87). The geography of modernization theory is presented as 
centers of modern progress versus peripheries of traditional backwardness (Peet, 1999: 
65, 80). 
In the view of modernization theory, Third World countries (traditional societies) 
are seen as isolated, parochial and technically primitive societies in which disease, 
hunger and malnutrition are daily problems – in short, these places are considered to be 
undeveloped (ibid, 1999: 84). The process of modernization is seen as a set a of stages 
that a traditional society must pass through in order reach modernity. This process was 
seen as inevitable and unidirectional (Larrain, 1989: 86). Underdevelopment is seen as a 
consequence of conditions internal to a traditional society (Lee, 2000c). Using Lee's 
reasoning, development is a consequence of conditions internal to a modern society. 
Figure 7 lists show traits that mark differences between traditional and modern societies.
 Peet (1999; 84, 85) argues that the world is divided between a “developed” First 
World (core) and an “undeveloped” Third World (periphery). It is assumed that 
modernization is a spatial diffusion process, originating in the First World and spreading 
to the Third World through contact points, such as ports or colonial administrative cities. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, modernization was measured using statistical indicators 
like the following:
1) the development of transport networks
2) the expansion and communication of information media
3) the growth of integrated urban systems
production in agriculture and industry. 
3) Take-off is achieved when blockages to steady and consistent economic growth are finally overcome
4) The drive toward maturity takes place as modern technology diffuses throughout all aspects of 
economic activity 
5) The final stage of high mass consumption is reached when leading industrial sectors produce 
consumer goods and services. Income rises to a level that permits people to consume at levels far above 
their basic needs. 
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4) the breakdown of traditional ethnic compartmentalization
5) the emergence of a money economy
6) the development of education
7) participation in non-parochial forms of organization and activity
8) proximity to, and interaction with urban cores that act as concentrators, 
adapters and distributors of modernization
9) geographical mobility
Modernization, however, is not just an analysis of measurable indices, its intention is to 
restructure the behavior of individuals and groups. Soja (1968: 4) argues that 
modernization “is simply not an increase in a set of indices. It involved profound changes 
in individual and group behavior.” 
Proponents of modernization theory insist that the West became dominant 
because of claims such as, “the European environment endowed Europeans with 
superior natural characteristics, like greater intelligence” or “superior social systems 
develop in rich natural environments (like Europe)” (Peet, 1999: 84). In this thesis, I 
argue, like Watts (2000a), that the creation of the modern world system is not due solely 
to internal factors or environmental determinism, but can be attributed largely to 
processes of colonialism and neocolonialism.
Peet's (1999: 123-135) argument on modernization theory makes explicit 
references to Edward Said's theory of Orientalism and I do see parts of Peet's argument 
having similarities with Said's. In Said's Orientalism the world is divided up into two 
unequal halves, the traditional Orient and the modern Occident. His key theme is that 
Western theorists and historians created, shaped and defended an idea of the Orient as 
“other” and as inferior to the Occident to justify the West's occupation, subjugation and 
exploitation of the Orient (Said, 1978; Gregory, 2000). This division is a result of internal 
factors in both the East and West. Although Orientalism is an idea that cannot be proven 
or disproven, it is an important part of contemporary political and cultural life (Said, 1978: 
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12-14). Again, modernization theory is much more than an explanation of 
underdevelopment, it expresses an entire system of Western attitudes toward the world 
(Peet, 1999: 84). 
Due to the essentalized and ahistorical view that modernization theory put forth, it 
became a target for criticism (Wallerstein, 2000: 108). Dependency theorists became 
some of the most vocal critics of modernization theory during the 1960s and 1970s 
(Slater, 2004; 119). They focused on three major critiques of modernization theory. The 
first was the essentialization of Third World societies as backward, traditional and 
stagnant. The second was an uncritical depiction of Third World/First World relationships 
in which it was assumed that interactions between the two worlds were beneficial to both 
parties. The final critique was that global processes like imperialism, colonialism, 
exploitation and domination were seen as unimportant or as necessary elements in the 
diffusion process (ibid, 2004: 139). 
4.3) Neoliberalism
Beginning in the early 1950s, modernization theory began to appear in academic 
circles and dominated theories of development for the rest of the 1950s and into the 
1960s (Slater, 1995: 67). But by the early 1970s, modernization theory had lost its 
privileged position due to widespread criticism. It continues to be relevant because it 
underlies most conventional development theories, including contemporary neoliberal 
thought (Peet, 1999: 85; Slater, 2004: 87). Modernization theory and neoliberal thought 
are similar in the respect that they both provide legitimation of First World dominance 
over the Third World, based on the presumption of First World superiority. This 
relationship is perceived as beneficial to both parties (Slater, 2004: 113). 
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By the early 1980s, neoliberalism came to describe “the predominantly laissez 
faire, market driven economic policies sweeping across the globe” (Cypher and Dietz, 
1997: 208). Neoliberalism puts emphasis upon private capital, competition, 
accumulation, deregulation, open economies and market oriented progress. But 
neoliberalism came to represent much more than economic policy. It began to 
encompass how a nation-state was governed, how civil societies interacted with their 
national governments and portrayed the individual to be market-oriented. The ideas that 
neoliberalism came to represent began to colonize the social and political aspects of 
society (Slater, 2004: 109-113). Like modernization theory, it seeks to make profound 
changes in individual and group behavior (Soja, 1968: 4). The market is considered not 
only a device for delivering goods and services, but also as the only possible way to 
regulate society (Melkote and Merriam, 1998: 23). The major unifying theme of 
neoliberal policies is that governments of nation-states should be creating 'opportunity' 
societies rather than 'welfare' societies (Corbridge, 2008: 115). 
The fundamental principle of neoliberalism is that the economy must be free from 
regulations placed on it by national governments – which include national economic 
regulations and social programs. In short national economies should be deregulated in 
order to promote the allocation of resources by the “market” rather than national 
governments (Routledge, 2003: 239). Neoliberalism involves the centralization of control 
of the world economy in the hands of transnational corporations (TNCs), governments of 
the Group of Eight Industrialized Countries (G-8), large international banks, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. 
These institutions enforce the doctrine of neoliberalism by enabling TNCs unrestricted 
access to a wide field of markets, including public services (Peck and Tickell, 2002). One 
30
important way in which large international organizations were able to take control of 
national economies using neoliberal principles is through the policy of structural 
adjustment. Structural adjustment programs were medium to long term (three to five 
year) economic devices aimed at changing the structure of an economy so that it 
mirrored the capitalist market ideal taken from the First World experience.
 Beginning in the early 1980s, loans were only given to countries willing to 
undertake structural adjustment. In neoliberal philosophy, it is thought that laissez faire 
economic policies would be the most efficient in allocating scarce resources (Peet, 1999; 
57). During the 1970s and 1980s, national governments of Third World countries were in 
situations were they found themselves unable to pay the interest on loans from large 
banks as well as the World Bank and IMF. Structural adjustment policies were adopted 
in exchange for continued financial support from the World Bank and the IMF. 
While neoliberal thought has gone beyond the domain of economics into social 
and political aspects of society (Slater, 2004: 109-112), progress is still understood in 
terms of economic growth. The basic idea is that modern competitive market behavior 
and technological modernization organized through free markets lead to economic 
growth and ultimately, material benefits for everyone. It is thought that Third World 
countries develop by copying models of industrial capitalism taken from the model of the 
First World (Peet, 1999: 195). 
While neoliberal thought has had a great deal of influence on development 
policies since the 1980s, it is not without its critics. Because modernization theory 
underlies neoliberal thought (Peet, 1999: 85; Slater, 2004: 87), it is subject to the same 
criticisms. Again these criticisms are (Slater, 2004: 139): 
1) The characterization of Third World societies as backward, traditional and 
stagnant
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2) The uncritical depiction of Third World/First World relationships in which it is
assumed that interactions between the two worlds are beneficial to both parties
3) Global processes such as imperialism, colonialism, exploitation and 
domination are seen as unimportant or necessary elements of the modernization 
process
Neoliberal policies have placed control of the world's economy into the hands of 
international organizations, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Due to conditional lending practices by these organizations to Third World 
countries, they are able to impose neoliberal policies upon countries that borrow money 
from them (Corbridge, 2008: 115; Willis, 2005: 52). 
These policies have led to large reductions in government spending on health, 
education, welfare and environmental protection across the world. As transnational 
corporations seek to become more competitive in increasingly unregulated markets, they 
have reduced wages, health care provisions and environmental protections (Routledge, 
2008: 240). Neoliberal policies tend to benefit political and business elites while the 
remainder of the population remains deprived of adequate services and income. The 
adoption of neoliberal policies has in most countries been linked to a significant increase 
in inequality in income and wealth (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006: 12; Corbridge, 2008: 115; 
Willis, 2005: 52). 
Modernization theory and neoliberal thought are important to my discussion 
because they are used in the construction of development discourse and development 
policy. In development discourse, the semi-periphery/periphery is represented by an 
entire cadre made up of academics, development professionals, bankers and 
government officials from the core. This discourse manufactures problems and 
abnormalities (such as poverty) which require treatment and reform. Development 
discourse works to create the semi-periphery and periphery politically, economically, 
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ideologically and culturally (Corbridge, 1995). As Slater 
(2004: 79) writes:
We are encouraged to believe that we live in postcolonial times, yet when the 
old forms of colonizing power have faded from sight, Third-World scholars refer 
to new processes of the recolonization of peripheral societies by metropolitan 
capital and organizations.
 Development projects created by the core are based upon modernization theory/
neoliberal thought. In the implementation of these projects peripheral nation-states are at 
a disadvantage in relation to core nation-states. Where the core was able to support its 
development on a resource base outside of its boundaries (in its colonies), peripheral 
nation-states face diminished resources within their political territories. The process of 
colonialism integrated peripheral economies into the world system as producers of raw 
materials for export to core (colonizer) economies. This facilitated the industrialization of 
the core at the expense of the periphery. This situation created a world economy which 
is dominated by industrial centers in the core. This places the periphery in a dependent 
relationship to the core that has continued since decolonization (Routledge, 1995: 265- 
267). In other words dependent relationships that formed as a result of colonialism 
continue to be perpetuated. 
While neoliberal thought has a great deal of influence on the modern world 
system, European colonialism is one of the primary factors in its formation. Morocco 
experienced monumental social, economic and political changes as a result of the 
colonial experience, which established its contemporary place in the world system. In 
order to understand Morocco as a place, it is necessary to understand its colonial 
geography and history. 
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Chapter 5 
Colonialism and the Moroccan Nation-State
“For more than two decades, I had been waiting to see the end of French rule in 
Morocco. Ingenuously I had imagined that after Independence the old manner of 
life would be resumed and the country would return to being more or less what it 
had been before the French presence. The detestation on the part of the 
populace of all that was European seemed to guarantee such a result. What I 
failed to understand was that if Morocco was still a largely medieval land, it was 
because the French themselves, and not the Moroccans, wanted it that way. 
The Nationalists were not interested in ridding Morocco of all traces of European 
civilization and restoring it to its pre-colonial state; on the contrary, their aim was 
to make it even more “European” than the French had made it. When France was 
no longer able to keep the governmental vehicle on the road, she abandoned it, 
leaving the motor running. The Moroccans climbed in and drove off in the same 
direction, but with even greater speed.” - Paul Bowles, 1981
5.1) The makhzan and Colonialism
Prior to 1912, the kingdom of Morocco was one of amorphous boundaries. The 
government of this kingdom was known as the makhzan (ﻥﺰﺨﻣ2 ). It did not fit the 
definition of the idealized nation-state in which political authority and national identity are 
congruent with clearly delimited boundaries (Pennell, 1993: 215; 2000). When the 
French took control of Morocco in 1912, the intention was to leave the makhzan in power 
under the French colonial protectorate model (Amin, 1970: 98-100). Although there was 
a semblance of native rule in Morocco under the French protectorate, in reality the 
French made all of the decisions and held all real power (Wright, 1991: 89). The French 
controlled Morocco from 1912 until 1956 and this experience led to massive social, 
economic and political changes. As Bowles, the American fiction writer who lived the 
Moroccan city of Tangier for over 50 years, writes above, the colonial experience not 
2 In this thesis, I have chosen to include Arabic spellings of certain words.
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only transformed the makhzan, it transformed Morocco. Burke (2000: 28), making a 
similar argument states that the colonial experience had a very significant effect on the 
contemporary Moroccan nation-state:
...the contemporary Moroccan state is not the old makhzan writ large. Whereas 
the latter was puny, the modern Moroccan state can deploy its power throughout 
the national territory, disciplining and orienting opinion, intervening in depth in 
the society where it chooses. Seen from this angle, the history of contemporary 
Morocco is characterized by a radical discontinuity with its precolonial past, and 
its culture is “modern” and not “traditional”. Modern in the sense that it is the 
result of a complex layering of heterogenous cultural practices strongly 
influenced by the European Enlightenment but shaped also by participation in a 
global world economy and international system. The selective amnesia under 
which the Moroccan state made its transition to modernity is especially striking. 
What Burke is trying to convey is that the role of colonialism in the formation of 
the Moroccan nation-state is incredibly important, but largely ignored within academia. 
The goal of this section of the thesis is to summarize the social, political and economic 
changes that French (and to a lesser degree Spanish) colonialism brought to Morocco 
and the prominent idea that many see as a reaction to colonialism called pan-Arabism. I 
do not want to discount Moroccan geography and history before 1912 in the formation of 
the contemporary Moroccan nation-state. But as Slater (2004: 140) writes, it is important 
to understand that colonialism created structures of domination, and that these 
structures continue to be reproduced. 
In addressing colonialism in Morocco, I am taking a 'post-colonial' approach, as 
defined by Slater (2004: 162). A post-colonial approach assumes that the imperiality of 
Western power is crucial for understanding modernity and the structure of the world 
system. Said (1993: 4) writes, “.....there is no just way in which the past can be 
quarantined from the present. Past and present inform each other”. 
I am arguing that while the French colonial project “modernized” Morocco in 
many ways, it also led to uneven development and to an extreme polarization of wealth 
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(Amin, 1970: 60; Cohen and Jaidi, 2006: 36; Davis, 2007: 167). Amin (1974: xi) writes 
that underdevelopment is product of colonization, not independence from it. 
Modernization theory and neoliberal thought posit the exact opposite of what Amin is 
arguing. It holds that underdevelopment within a nation-state is a result of internal 
failures rather than outside factors (Lee, 2000c; Slater, 2004: 61). 
I see three problems with modernization theory and neoliberal thought in the 
Moroccan context. First, it takes the nation-state for granted, not recognizing that the 
nation-state is a result of geographical and historical processes. It is not the “natural” 
order of human society. Geographical and historical processes are not acknowledged in 
the formation of nation-states.  Secondly, within the previous discussion of the Third 
World/First World divide, dependency theory and the core-periphery model, world 
systems analysis and the world cities hypothesis, I made the argument that 
underdevelopment is largely a function of exploitative relationships that have their basis 
in the European colonial system. Therefore, underdevelopment cannot be attributed 
completely to internal failures. Lastly, the only way to understand how Morocco has 
become part of the underdeveloped Third World and its periphery status in the modern 
world system is through an understanding of Morocco's colonial geography and history. 
Watts reminds us that colonialism has been a fundamental force in the making of the 
Third World and in the shaping of the modern world system (2000: 93). Gregory (2000: 
614) adds to Watts' idea by writing, “post-colonialism ought not become a premature 
celebration of the 'end' of colonialism but instead act as a forceful and unsettling 
reminder of the constitution of our own colonial present.”  
Although Morocco is associated mainly with French control from 1912 until 1956, 
Spain controlled a significant amount of territory within Morocco during this time. Spain 
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controlled the northern quarter of present-day Morocco, the enclave of Sidi Ifni, the 
Spanish Sahara (now known as Western Sahara) and an area between the northern 
border of the Spanish Sahara and the Draa River. Despite the extensive size of the 
Spanish holdings, the French zone of control had the largest cities, the best agricultural 
land and a much more comprehensive development of infrastructure (Pennell, 2000: 
305; Spencer, 1993: 91). In 1912 Spain took control of the northern quarter of Morocco. 
This territory was deemed el hueso de chuleta or “the bone of the chop” by the Spanish 
because of differences in physical geography between the Spanish and French zones. 
The northern Spanish zone of Morocco was made up almost entirely of the impenetrable 
Rif mountains, whereas the French zone encompassed all of Morocco's arable lands to 
the south of the Rif (Spencer, 1993: 92). The arable lands of the French zone largely 
were appropriated by French colonial government and redistributed to French settlers 
and French corporations for the establishment of farms that specialized in export crops 
(Davis, 2007)
At the time of independence in 1956, the French zone contained the economic 
core, while the Spanish zone was relegated to the periphery. These differences between 
the zones reflect the differences in Spanish and French economic situations during the 
early twentieth century. Spain was largely a marginal colonial player by 1912, having lost 
most of its colonial empire by 1825 (Lalutte, 1976: 7; Watts, 2000: 153). At the time of 
colonization in Morocco, the Spanish treasury lacked the funds to administer 
metropolitan Spain3, let alone subsidize the development of colonies until they became 
profitable (Pennell, 2000). The French zone of Morocco, on the other hand, saw massive 
3 In this thesis, I will refer to the parent nation-state of a colony as the metropole or describe it as 
metropolitan. The Oxford American Dictionary (2003: 1068) defines metropole as “the parent 
state of a colony” and metropolitan as “relating to, or denoting the parent state of a colony or 
dependency.” 
37
investment in infrastructure. For example, between 1912 and 1951, the French colonial 
government built 1800 kilometers of railroad track, 43,000 kilometers of all-season 
roads, constructed a huge port at Casablanca (which in 1951 handled 5,500,000 metric 
tons of freight) and through dam construction and irrigation projects, brought 405,000 
hectares of irrigated land into production (Brace, 1963: 53). 
France had the second largest colonial empire in the world after Britain when 
Morocco was occupied in 1912. 'Greater France' at its peak extended to ten million 
kilometers and had one-hundred million citizens and subjects. It stretched from the West 
Indies to islands in the South Pacific. In between were large holdings in North and West 
Africa, coastal enclaves in India and the majority of Indochina (Aldrich, 2005: 3; Liauzu, 
2007: 324). By 1912, France had become well-practiced at taking control of territories 
and economically integrating them with the metropole – while at the same time leaving 
them politically and socially unintegrated (Leveau, 1993: 248; Watts, 2000: 93). 
France had taken control of Algeria in 1830 (Liauzu, 2007: 28) and Tunisia in 
1881 (Brunshwig, 1966: 55). Both Algeria and Tunisia are very similar to Morocco in 
respect to their human and physical geographies (Amin, 1978: 17; Davis, 2007: 177-
186). As a result, France's history of capturing and controlling territory in North Africa 
gave it a very well-developed colonial policies in Morocco. Underlying these policies was 
French colonial philosophy, which is the subject of the next section.  
5.2) French Colonial Philosophy
In order to understand how French colonialism worked in Morocco, it is important 
to know the philosophy that stood behind it. Watts (2000: 93) writes, “characteristic 
features of the colonial situation include political and legal domination over an alien 
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society, relations of economic and political dependence and exploitation between 
imperial power and colony, and racial and cultural inequality.” Wright (1991: 141), in the 
same vein states, “the fact of colonial power is inescapable: it was authoritarian, 
discriminatory, and debilitating. No account of the benefits can evade or counterbalance 
this stark truth.” In short, metropolitan France, like other colonial powers, forced its 
colonies into relationships of exploitation. 
How could the French Republic, which prides itself on promoting liberty, equality 
and fraternity rationalize colonial relationships that were exploitative at their core (Amin, 
1977: 112; Brace, 1963: 41; Sartre, 1963: 15)? There were two related ideas that 
justified this exploitation. The first was la mission civilisatrice, or the civilizing mission, 
and the second was assimilation. The intent of the civilizing mission was to educate and 
remold colonial societies into the path of “progress” and away from “backwardness”. This 
viewpoint celebrated French military conquest of its colonies and the bringing of French 
civilization to them (Burke 2000: 19). Gafaiti (2003: 197) writes of the French civilizing 
mission:
....throughout the nineteenth century, France developed its nationalism inside 
(Metropolitan France) and outside (French colonies) on the basis of a deeply 
rooted racist ideology. Under various forms, even after the decolonization 
following the end of World War II, this process continued. This ideology and the  
policies associated with it took various designations such as....the mission 
civilisatrice in the nineteenth century and coopération technique et culturelle 
in the second half of the twentieth century. Today it is continuing, somehow  
subtly under a different disguise, in the shape of the French government's 
policy of “Francophonie.”
As Gafaiti writes above, the civilizing mission was based on a deeply rooted 
racist ideology in which French metropolitan culture is seen as superior to “barbaric and 
peripheral” cultures existing in the colonies. Prior to and after French conquest, colonies 
were seen by the metropole as culturally retarded, politically corrupt and economically 
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backward (Burke, 2000: 19; Césaire: 1989: 9; Corbridge: 1993: 179; Davis; 2007: 91; 
Fanon, 1963: 213; Keller, 2007: 5; Slavin, 1993, 113).  The civilizing mission strived for 
French cultural predominance in language, laws and even architectural style (Wright, 
1997: 326). Due to the perceived shortcomings of societies that existed in the colonies, 
the civilizing mission sought the “development” of French colonies in all senses (Keller, 
2007: 4, 5). 
The idea of assimilation was very closely linked to the civilizing mission. For 
colonial subjects to have equal status and rights with French citizens, it was believed 
that they had to acquire French culture. It was only after colonial subjects had absorbed 
a French identity were they granted full rights as citizens in the French Republic. This 
was the essence of the idea of assimilation (Maghraoui, 2003: 217, 218). The French 
language was seen as the primary means of transmission of French culture from the 
metropole to the colonies (Ager, 1996: 47). Therefore, in order for a colonial subject to 
be seen as completely “French” and fully assimilated into French society, they had to be 
proficient in the French language. Following the line of reasoning discussed in the 
previous paragraph, i.e., that the civilizing mission stated French culture is superior to all 
others, assimilation ideology involves the belief that the French language is superior to 
all others. 
There is an uncommonly strong tie between the French language and French 
culture. The two were and are seen as inseparable by the French state (Glissant, 2003: 
105). Beginning around 1870 and continuing up to the present day, the French state 
allows only one variety of the French language to be taught in French schools, despite 
the existence of regional patois or dialects within metropolitan France. The goal of this 
policy was to construct a nation-state in which the “French nation” was congruent with 
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the boundaries of the French state (Gafaiti, 2003: 192; Western, 2003: 164). It was 
within this context that idea of assimilation was formed (Gafaiti, 2003: 193; Maghroui, 
2003: 218). As a result of the strong tie between French language and French culture, 
the French language has played a very large role in the idea of assimilation. 
One of the most prominent ideals of the French Republic is universalism (Stovall 
and Van den Abbeele, 2003: 4), a principle that stresses the importance of loyalty and 
concern for others regardless of nationality, ethnicity and religion (McKean, 2005). In the 
context of the idea of assimilation, universalism only applies to individuals who are 
considered properly “French”. Modern nation-states are built on the idea of nationalism - 
an idea which is inherently racist. This is certainly true of French nationalism. There is no 
room in the French identity as defined by the French state for multiculturalism (Gafaiti, 
2003: 192-195).  
Stovall and Van den Abbeele (2003: 5) argue that France considered itself to be 
the epitome of civilization and that to be French was synonymous with being civilized. 
Becoming French meant speaking French perfectly, while developing a taste for French 
theater, cuisine or wine. Additionally, part of the process of becoming French meant 
shedding a former, and ultimately inferior, identity. The idea of assimilation has long 
operated as a cover for religious, racial and national exclusion. “Backward” cultures of 
the colonies were seen to be incompatible with the universalist values of the French 
identity (Liazu, 2007: 124; Magroui, 2003: 215). 
In the language of French colonialism, there were three ways in which colonies 
were controlled outside of the metropole. The first was making an extra-metropolitan 
territory politically integrated with France (Algeria) (Brace, 1964: 19). The second was 
direct rule where colonial administrators directly ruled colonial subjects (Madagascar) 
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(Wright, 1991: 248). The third was a protectorate or indirect rule where French 
administrators only were placed at the highest levels of administration and local rulers 
managed day-to-day affairs (Tunisia) (Brunshwig, 1966: 55) 
Morocco was a protectorate in name, but Wright calls the protectorate a fiction 
(1991: 89). Hoisington points out that while indirect rule was attempted in Morocco, it 
was never achieved. It was incredibly difficult to find Moroccans who would align 
themselves with France. Additionally, administrators in the French protectorate failed to 
follow their own rules, making and unmaking leaders in order to exploit unequal power 
relationships, rather than simply supervising native leaders as the rules required (1995: 
135). Hassan II, the king of Morocco from 1962 until his death in 1999, discussed 
indirect French rule in his autobiography: “When some historians talk of the 'absolute 
power of the Sultan' in the time of the Protectorate, they mean 'the absolute power of the 
Résident Général' (1978: 90). Under the French protectorate, the Moroccan king was 
referred to as sultan and highest ranking French colonial administrator was called the 
Résident Général.
Amin (1970: 98-100) argues that behind the screen of native sovereignty, 
Morocco was ruled in the exact same way as Algeria - directly by a French 
administration. The objectives of French colonization in North Africa turned out to be the 
same everywhere: agricultural and settler colonization and the creation of administrative 
and commercial French cities. In short, a protectorate existed in theory, but in reality little 
difference existed between Algeria, which was technically part of France, and the 
Moroccan protectorate. In the end, regardless of the technicalities of how an extra-
metropolitan territory was classified by the metropole, French rule was the same 
everywhere. These exploitative relationships were justified by the civilizing mission and 
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assimilation. 
The similarities between French colonial philosophy and modernization 
theory/neoliberal thought are striking and they are very much linked. The concept of 
modernity is built out of selective readings of geography and history of the First World 
and used as a comparative device for the Third World. In this comparison, the First 
World is the only acceptable model. Although modernization theory/neoliberal thought 
uses new language from contemporary social sciences, they seek to define and achieve 
exactly the same things as earlier supremacist and colonialist philosophies through the 
demarcation of a modern world and a traditional world (Sardar, 1999: 78; Slater, 1995: 
67; Peet and Watts, 1993). 
While colonial philosophy, modernization theory and neoliberalism share similar 
world views, key distinctions can be made between them. The agent of development in 
colonial philosophies is the colonial government and the European world views that it 
introduces. In modernization theory, national governments are seen to be the primary 
agents of development, which lead nation-states through discrete stages of development 
from a traditional society to a society of high mass consumption (Peet, 1999: 83). In 
neoliberal thought, capitalism that has been freed from state control, is seen to be the 
primary agent of development (Slater, 2004). 
5.3) Agricultural Colonization and The New Cities
The philosophy and ideals behind French colonialism served the larger goal of 
the French metropole of taking control of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Amin argues that 
the objectives of French colonization in North Africa turned out to be the same 
everywhere: agricultural and settler colonization and the creation of administrative and 
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commercial French cities (1970: 98-100).  Agricultural colonization resulted in the 
disenfranchisement of Moroccans from their land. Many European settlers and 
businesses and a small minority of elite Moroccans became wealthy from this process. 
But it also led to the mass impoverishment of nearly 8 million indigenous Moroccans. At 
independence in 1956, nearly 42 percent of Moroccans were landless. Although 
Europeans only comprised 0.5 percent of the landowning population, they owned 47 
percent of all irrigated land (Davis, 2007: 167). French cities and towns were established 
that resulted in the creation of distinct French cities right next to old Arab/Moroccan 
cities. This urban form resulted in a protectorate-sanctioned uneven development 
between the two zones (Hoisington, 1995: 108; Wright, 1997: 331). 
Sedentarization and land dispossession policies by the French colonial 
government utilized an environmental narrative which stated that land use practices of 
indigenous Moroccan herders, including the use of fire to accelerate the growth of 
vegetation, were permanently damaging to the environment. This permanent damage 
was viewed in terms of irreversible deforestation and desertification. The claims that this 
narrative made were largely false. Pollen analysis of lake sediment cores show that the 
vegetation of North Africa has been relatively stable for the past 4,000 years, making it 
highly unlikely that the practices of nomadic herders have caused permanent 
desertification. Grazing became restricted and regulated and herders were required to 
have permits in order to use rangeland and forest for grazing animals. These restrictive 
practices encouraged sedentarization. Therefore large portions of the population that 
were nomadic prior to the establishment of the French protectorate became sedentary. 
Commodity production by European colonists was privileged over the subsistence 
production of Moroccans (Davis, 2007).
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Land dispossession and restrictive grazing policies deprived large numbers of 
Moroccan pastoralists and agropastoralists of the ability to support themselves through 
livestock grazing. This benefited European colonists owning large farms because they 
were in need of a cheap source of labor for their export-oriented farms. A similar 
scenario happened in Algeria and Tunisia decades earlier, where large shares of the 
rural population had been dislocated and forced into wage labor by French colonial 
policies (ibid, 2007: 163). This example points out a fundamental aspect of French 
colonialism: inexpensive agricultural products were provided to the metropole by 
underpaying colonial subjects for their agricultural work (Amin, 1974: 15). 
Agriculture became geared towards meeting the needs of the metropole, 
specializing in producing a small number of goods, like citrus fruits, wines, olive oil, 
sugar and linseed oil. Because of this specialization, the Moroccan protectorate (as well 
as Algeria and Tunisia) had to import large amounts of basic foodstuffs. Prior to 1912, 
Morocco produced enough surplus grain to be an exporter of cereals. By 1940, cereals 
had to be imported because agricultural production had shifted to speciality products that 
supplied the French market (Brace, 1964: 52; Gramsci, 1977: 302; Seddon, 2000: 208). 
The effects of agricultural colonization were not isolated in North Africa to French 
controlled territories alone. Similar scenarios occurred in Egypt (a British colony) 
(Mitchell, 1988: 16) and Libya (an Italian colony) (Ahmida, 2000: 1).
In addition to land dispossession and its social effects, a great deal of 
environmental destruction resulted from French colonialism in Morocco. The introduction 
of “modern” European agricultural practices poorly suited to the arid environments of 
North Africa led to increased soil erosion. Additionally, an unknown number of hectares 
of forest were destroyed during the Moroccan war of occupation. The French army 
45
cleared large areas of forest by burning and cutting down trees in an attempt to control 
groups resisting colonial occupation (Brace, 1963: 49; Davis, 2007: 168). 
Settler and administrative towns were built throughout Morocco. I will concentrate 
on the most important of these, called villes nouvelles or new cities. These new cities 
were built next to the older, fortified Arab/Moroccan cities known in Arabic as mudun 
(plural) or medina (singular). This urban policy was carried out in five places: 
Casablanca, Fes, Marrakesh, Meknes and Rabat (Hoisington, 1995: 109). The concept 
of the “dual city” guided attempts to preserve mosques, street fronts, and other kinds of 
ordinary cultural forms of the old Arab cities (Wright, 1997: 328). Meanwhile, the new 
French cities situated next to the Arab cities were built “modern” from the ground up. In 
theory, these cities would lead separate, but connected lives (Hoisington: 1995: 109). 
The French civilizing mission was evident here in the bringing of a metropolitan 
version of modernity to the colonies in the form of urban planning and design. But, by the 
time Morocco had been incorporated into the French empire, the concept of assimilating 
colonial subjects had proven to be impractical. Pennell (2000: 159) writes:
The idea of assimilation, of turning the colonised people into Frenchmen by 
educating them in the political, judicial and economic values of France, had 
crumbled in the face of its real cost and the realisation that the 'natives' would 
swamp the 'real' French population. The policy had shifted towards association: 
the French army would impose control, but the institutions of the conquered 
would be preserved and local leaders accommodated and made 
dependent upon the French. A few natives would be allowed to evolve into 
French nationals provided they showed their loyalty to France. 
The concept of the dual city could be considered a form of geographic association 
(Wright, 1997: 328). Regardless of how the dual city urban form was influenced by 
French colonial philosophy, the French colonial government still had all the real power in 
the planning and administering of important urban areas. What was clear about this 
situation was that all 5 cities were redesigned according French plans only. This urban 
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partnership was negotiated completely on French terms (Hoisington, 1995: 108; Wright, 
1997: 331). 
Massive land dispossession in rural areas by agricultural colonization led to 
migration to urban areas within Morocco (Pennell, 2000: 179). On the outskirts of the 5 
redesigned cities, unplanned bidonvilles or shantytowns started to spring up. Wright 
(1991: 152-160) identifies two factors in French plans that did not allow for the cities to 
absorb all of the migrants. The first was not planning for growth in the Arab portions of 
the cities (the mudun). In most cases, the villes nouvelles had encircled the old Arab 
cities, leaving no room for the massive influx of people that had been recently 
dispossessed of their land. The second factor was the expensive real estate and rent 
prices in the villes nouvelles that most ordinary Moroccans were unable to afford. This 
relegated Moroccans either to living in the old cities (mudun), which had no more room 
for growth or in the rapidly growing bidonvilles. 
By writing about French and Spanish colonialism, I do not want to give the 
impression that European colonialism is the only factor that has formed the Moroccan 
nation-state. But as Burke (2000: 28) points out, it is important not to forget the important 
role of French and Spanish colonialism in the formation of the Morocco as it is today. I 
will now make direct connections between the colonial era and the occupation of 
Western Sahara, as well as language, economic and immigration policies. 
5.4) The Post-colonial Moroccan Nation-State
In the broad-scale decolonization that occurred in the second half of the 20th 
century, boundaries demarcated during the colonial era served as the territorial basis for 
post-colonial nation-states (Watts, 2000b: 153). This was especially true in the case of 
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African continent. In 1963, the Organization of African States (OAU) was established 
and based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The OAU, which has enjoyed a great deal of 
legitimacy since its inception, stressed the validity of colonial-era boundaries in Africa in 
order to avoid conflict between African nation-states (Barnett, 2000: 205; Slater, 2004: 
178).
The wishes of the OAU did not mean that all colonial boundaries were respected. 
Perhaps the most egregious boundary violation occurred when Spain withdrew from its 
colony of the Spanish Sahara (now known as Western Sahara) in 1975. Mauritania and 
Morocco laid claim to the territory through military occupation, both fighting battles with 
the Polisario Front, a guerilla group formed in Western Sahara in 1973 (The Polisario 
Front is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7). Mauritania was unable to continue 
fighting after 1978 due to the high costs involved, leaving fighting for the disputed 
territory to the Polisario Front and Morocco (Pennell, 2000: 340, 341). 
The puzzle of why colonial boundaries have continued to be relevant throughout 
the world after decolonization is a question that is too large to be addressed in this 
thesis. But in the case of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, economic dependency on 
Europe is cited as the primary factor thwarting efforts of greater economic, social and 
political integration among the three countries (Amin, 1970: 218). This situation, true at 
independence, has continued. In the 1990's, only 7 percent of Morocco's total exports 
were sent to Algeria and Tunisia, whereas 30 percent of its total exports went to France 
(Seddon, 2000: 226).  
Colonial economies are set up to complement the economy of the metropole, not 
stand on their own. Political independence did little to change this arrangement (Fanon 
1963: 152-159). Seddon (2000) argues that the colonial experience created Morocco as 
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a European periphery. Attempts to move out of the periphery since decolonization 
through greater political, social and economic integration among the three former French 
colonies of North Africa have not come to fruition due to mounting external debt and the 
resulting economic structural adjustment. The European Union, not subject to the same 
neoliberal economic reforms as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, continues to erect barriers 
(i.e. agricultural subsidies) to protect its own internal economy. 
Morocco is a sender of immigrants to Europe. It also serves as a way station for 
migrants from other places, like sub-Saharan Africa, attempting to gain access to Europe 
(Burke, 2006: 295; Pastore, 2002: 108, 118). Because of Morocco's close proximity to 
Europe, it is located on one of the major North/South migration routes into the EU 
(Collyer, 2007: 669). Due to this dual role as a sender of immigrants and as a way 
station, the migration situation is incredibly complex. It is difficult to discuss Morocco's 
role as a way station for non-Moroccans in the context of European colonialism because 
of this complexity. But, both French and Spanish colonialism did establish the pattern of 
Moroccan migration to Europe (Pastore, 2002: 106-109, MacMurry, 2006).
Even though Morocco largely continues to function as an independent political 
entity that derives much of its power and legitimacy from its French colonial project 
(Leveau, 1993: 253), it is greatly affected by ideas that have arisen outside of Europe. 
Perhaps the most important of these ideas is pan-Arabism. Pan-Arabism at its core is 
the idea that people using the Arabic language form a “nation” in which all groups of 
people within this nation are culturally homogenous. Pan-Arabism is an idea that is 
based upon the region of the “Arab world”. Amin (1978: 11) writes that while the Arab 
world is a socially important fact, its boundaries can be difficult to define:
The Arab world stretches over several thousand miles within.....the midriff of the 
Old World, which reaches from the Atlantic to tropical Asia. It occupies a specific 
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part of that area, isolated from Europe by the Mediterranean, from Black Africa by 
the Sahara, and from the Turkish and Persian worlds by the mountains of Taurus, 
of Kurdistan and Western Iran. This Arab world is not exactly congruent with the 
Muslim world. The latter occupies almost all of the semi-arid area shared by four
peoples (the Arabs, the Turks, the Persians and the Indo-Afghanis), overspills a 
little into tropical Asia (Bengal, Indonesia) and, more recently, into certain areas 
of Black Africa (West and East Africa). Nor can the Arab world be reduced to 
some or other ethno-racial phenomenon, for Arabisation has mixed together 
many peoples with different origins and different racial components.
While Amin argues that the Arab world cannot be reduced to a single religion (Islam) or 
“race” (“Arab”), Omar states that the factor tying the Arab world together is a linguistic 
link through the common use of a multitude of Arabic dialects (2007).
The Arab world is often further divided based upon differences in geography and 
history. Like the Arab world itself, these subdivisions are ambiguous. Amin (1974: 12) 
divides the Arab world into three zones. The first zone is the Arab East (or al mashreq 
(ﻕﺮﺸﳌﺍ) in Arabic) which includes the Arabian peninsula, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel 
and Iraq. The second zone is the countries of the Nile - Egypt and Sudan. The third zone 
is the Arab West (or al maghreb (ﺏﺮﻔﳌﺍ)), which includes Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco. 
Irrespective of how the Arab world or regions within it are defined, the important 
aspect is to recognize the linguistic and cultural diversity present within it (Amin, 1978: 8, 
12; Kamal and Moukaddem, 1998: 184). At independence, Morocco adopted a language 
policy that favored Modern Standard Arabic only in order to link language policy to the 
idea of pan-Arabism. At this time, colloquial varieties of Arabic, Amazigh languages and 
French were ignored. One of the main reasons why Modern Standard Arabic was 
adopted was to promote unity across the Arab world. However, the monolithic language 
policy adopted at independence does not recognize the linguistic diversity present within 
the Arab world, let alone Morocco (Marley, 2004: 25). 
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As stated previously, although Morocco was a protectorate, in reality the French 
colonial government held all real power. This meant that French was the language of 
power in colonial Morocco (Marley, 2004b: 64). This fact, coupled with the unreal and 
racist expectations of assimilation (or association at this point) left a small, French-
speaking elite in power at independence in 1956 (Yacine, 1993: 225). As I have argued, 
colonialism played a significant role in the making of the Moroccan nation-state and 
creating its place in the modern world system.
5.5) The Moroccan Nation-State's Place in the Modern World System
I have now discussed the idealized nation-state, alternative world geographic 
orders (the Third World/First World divide, dependency theory and the core periphery 
model, world-systems analysis, and the world-cities hypothesis) and colonialism's role in 
the creation of the Moroccan nation-state. My aim thus far has been to demonstrate that 
while the nation-state dominates the world geographical order and our spatial 
imaginations, it is not the “natural” order of human society. The division of the world into 
clearly delimited nation-states is the result of geographical and historical processes. 
It is impossible to move away from the idea of the nation-state in this thesis, but it 
is possible to place the Moroccan nation-state (albeit briefly) into the alternative 
geographic orders described above, and that is the goal of this section of the thesis. In 
my attempts to place Morocco into these alternative geographic orders, their 
shortcomings that were described will become evident. But, it is important to place 
Morocco within all four of these alternative geographical orders because all four ideas 
build off of each other and are difficult to explain in isolation. 
51
Morocco as Part of the Third World 
Using the criteria of the Third World/First World divide, Morocco is classified as 
part of the Third World using the indicators of GNP per capita, infant mortality rate, and 
life expectancy (Kamal and Moukaddem, 1998: 187, 188). The problem with classifying 
Morocco as part of the Third World is that levels of development are by no means equal 
within Morocco. 
Throughout the world, there are islands of First World within the Third World and 
vice versa (Melkote and Merriam, 1998: 23). While the Third World/First World divide is 
socially important and an incredibly useful theoretical tool, it is very difficult to define in 
reality (Drakkakis-Smith, 2000: 6). It also utilizes the same modern/traditional dichotomy 
that is present in modernization theory and neoliberal thought. Within Morocco, there are 
islands of the First World within islands of the Third World, while at the same time it is 
difficult to neatly split the modern and traditional (Burke, 2000). 
Morocco as Dependent and as Part of the Periphery
The Third World/First World divide and dependency theory and the core-
periphery model are very similar in the way that they view the world. The main difference 
lies in the fact that the First World/Third World divide is informed by modernization theory 
and argues that underdevelopment in the Third World is the result of internal failures, 
whereas dependency theory and the core-periphery model argue that underdevelopment 
in the periphery is due to external factors, i.e. economic patterns established by 
European colonialism (So, 1990: 96). 
Seddon (2000: 198, 213) writes that the colonial experience created Morocco as 
a European periphery. In the chapter on Morocco's colonial geography and history, I 
argued, like Seddon, that it was the colonial experience that was largely responsible in 
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the formation of this situation. Based on Morocco's classification into the Third World, it 
also falls into the periphery. The problem with classifying Morocco as a dependent 
periphery to the core of Europe is that it gives the impression that levels of development 
are equal throughout Morocco. Morocco, like all other nation-states throughout the 
world, experiences unequal development and therefore placing it in one category of a 
dichotomous theory simplifies the complex political, social and economic situations of 
Morocco. 
Morocco as Part of the Periphery in the World System
Attempting to conduct a world-systems analysis on Morocco is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. As Willis (2004: 75) argues, world-systems analysis results in such broad-
scale theories that become impossible to test. But, the vocabulary created by world-
systems analysis is the most appropriate in describing Morocco's place in the 
contemporary geographic order (the modern world system). While this vocabulary does 
have it shortcomings, it is an improvement over the Third World/First World divide and 
dependency theory and the core-periphery model. Morocco has been classified as part 
of the periphery in the world-system (Drakakis-Smith, 2000: 5; Willis, 2005: 75). 
The core's relationship with the semi-periphery and periphery is one of unequal 
power relationships. The world's economy is structured unfairly in ways that result in the 
core exploiting countries of the semi-periphery and periphery. Core countries do not 
have to employ overt uses of force in order to further their interests (read: structural 
adjustment and the imposition of neoliberalist policies). Core countries enjoy power over 
others as a result of their structural position (Painter, 2008: 62). 
Friedmann's (1965, 1966) model provides another possible way of configuring 
the core-periphery relations within Morocco. Casablanca can be considered a core, the 
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Rif mountains as a periphery, the arable land lying between the Rif mountains and 
Casablanca as a semi-peripheral development corridor and the Western Sahara as a 
resource frontier. But using this model risks a very generalized view of Morocco's 
internal geography. This model also relatedly points to the world-cities hypothesis. 
Morocco and the World-Cities Hypothesis
In Peter Taylor's World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis he undertakes a 
wide ranging analysis of world-cities based upon ideas from Friedmann's (1986) initial 
world-cities hypothesis. A problem Taylor encounters in the beginning of his study is that 
there is not a clear understanding of how cities can in fact be classified as world-cities. 
Taylor, citing 16 significant academic articles published between 1986 and 1999 on 
world-cities, finds that the 16 articles agree on only four cities: London, New York, Paris 
and Tokyo. Outside of these four cities, there are 78 other cities that at least 1 article 
mentions (2004: 40). 
Casablanca, considered Morocco's economic capital, is not one of these 82 cities 
identified by the articles Taylor cites, nor are any other Moroccan cities identified. 
However, Taylor goes on to argue that due to the communications revolution, all cities 
are global. It is just a difference of degrees in which they are incorporated into the world- 
system (2004: 14). But the dearth of Moroccan cities in world-cities literature could be 
taken as an indicator of its peripheral status in the world-system.
The world-cities hypothesis is marginally useful to this thesis in the way that it is 
described by Friedmann (1986) and Taylor (2004) because Morocco is not discussed in 
world-cities literature. But, the idea that cities are “nodes” of globalization and 
development that are more connected to the global economy than their own hinterlands 
is very useful in that it demonstrates that globalization (and development) do not have 
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even spatial distributions. Large farms that produce specialty crops for export in the 
colonial manner are an example of nodes of development. Even though they employ 
Moroccan labor, they are more connected with economies outside of Morocco than the 
Moroccan economy itself. This idea ties into Slater's idea of uneven development (2004: 
123), which contends that backward zones of undeveloped countries have always 
played the role of internal colonies in relation to developing urban centers or productive 
agricultural areas. 
The goal of Chapter 5 has been to establish a context for the nation-state of 
Morocco by discussing Morocco's colonial geography and history and how they have 
influenced the formation of the Moroccan nation-state and its place in the world system. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss critical geopolitics as a method of deconstructing taken-
for-granted viewpoints of the Moroccan nation-state. 
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Chapter 6  
Critical Geopolitics and Methods
6.1) Critical Geopolitics 
Taylor (1993: 44), describes a model for viewing the world-system that has three 
scales: local, nation-state and global. The key dynamic in this model is that the nation-
state moderates between the local and global scales. The degree of influence that the 
world-system has on a particular locality is determined by how a nation-state fits into the 
world-system (whether it is in the core, semi-periphery or periphery). Taylor's model will 
be used to join the previously discussed scales of the nation-state and the global to the 
local scale. 
Now that the idea of the nation-state has been examined as well as different 
ways of looking at the global scale, it is necessary to look at its moderating role on the 
local scale (local in this sense means within nation-state boundaries). From this point 
forward, the local scale will refer to the Moroccan nation-state's internal role. In this 
thesis, the moderating role of the nation-state of Morocco on the local scale will be 
examined using an approach developed within political geography called critical 
geopolitics. 
Political geography is fixated on the sovereign state ideal and the nation-state 
system that has arisen from it (Painter, 2008: 66, Taylor 1993: 45). However, the 
discussion to this point has argued the importance of looking past the sovereign state 
ideal. So how is it possible to do a study in political geography and avoid privileging the 
idealized nation-state? Part of this issue was addressed in the discussion of Moroccan 
colonial geography and history and placing Morocco into the modern world-system. In 
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the discussion of the local scale, I will employ an approach developed within political 
geography called critical geopolitics that will allow me to demonstrate the constructed 
nature of the Moroccan nation-state. 
Before I discuss how I will utilize critical geopolitics, it is important to understand 
why it has been developed as method of analysis for conventional geopolitics. As O 
Tuathail (1996: 1) writes “Geography is about power. Although it is often assumed to be 
innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature, but a product of histories 
of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy and 
administer space.” Geography and power are tied to conventional geopolitics in that the 
purpose of conventional geopolitics as a practice is to create particular geographical 
information that serves in the task of organizing, occupying and administering space. 
Geography as presented by conventional geopolitics is a social and historical discourse, 
which is always bound up with politics and ideology (O Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 79). 
Therefore, conventional geopolitics is a way of constructing geographical information in 
order to promote political projects of domination (Taylor, 2000d).  
Critical geopolitics has evolved as a reaction to the situated knowledge of 
conventional geopolitical reasoning (O Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 79):
This claim is a long-standing one in the geopolitical tradition which from the 
beginning was opposed to the proposition that great leaders and humans alone
will determine the course of history, politics and society. Rather it was the
natural environment and geographical setting of a state which exercised the 
greatest influence on its destiny....By its own understandings and terms,
geopolitics is taken to be a domain of hard truths, material realities and 
irrepressible natural facts....The great irony of geopolitical writing however, 
is that it was always a highly ideological and deeply politicized form of analysis.
As O Tuathail and Agnew write above, geopolitics presents its information as “hard 
truths, material realities and irrepressible natural facts.” But in reality, information created 
from conventional geopolitical reasoning is never objective or impartial. Geopolitical 
57
reasoning works by suppressing the complex geographical reality of places in favor of 
simplified geographical abstractions (ibid, 1992: 82). 
Critical geopolitics is not a set of coherent methods or rules; it is 'parasitical' on 
conventional geopolitical reasoning (O Tuathail, 1996: 68). O Tuathail and Dalby (1998: 
4-6) argue that critical geopolitics understands conventional geopolitics as a broad social 
and cultural phenomenon. Conventional geopolitics is a set of practices with elitist and 
popular forms of expression, which can be subdivided into 3 categories: 
1) Practical Geopolitics: used by state leaders and foreign policy bureaucracies
2) Formal Geopolitics: used by think tanks and academia
3) Popular Geopolitics: found within articles of popular culture (i.e. magazines,
    novels or movies)
I interpret critical geopolitics as a way to question “indisputable” geographical 
information created by conventional geopolitical reasoning. Conventional geopolitical 
reasoning presents ideologized and politicized geographical information as objective 
geographical information. For this reason geographical information created by 
conventional geopolitical reasoning cannot be taken at face value. It must be 
questioned. The reason for this is summed up by O Tuathail and Dalby (1998: 6):
In seeking alternative reality as presented by the dominant players of the global 
and national politics, the practitioners of critical geopolitics have called into 
question the very foundations on which relations between states and social 
groups are forged, political decisions made, hostilities commenced, and treaties 
negotiated.
In this thesis, my use of critical geopolitics thus calls into question some of the 
very foundations of the Moroccan nation-state, and the way in which the Moroccan 
nation-state is viewed from the outside. Along the same conceptual lines as O Tuathail 
and Agnew (1992: 79) I demonstrate that the ways the Moroccan nation-state is 
portrayed by conventional geopolitical representations are not indisputable geographical 
facts, but rather simplified and ahistorical abstractions. Throughout this thesis, I have 
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asked and will continue to ask questions about how taken-for-granted geopolitical 
entities are constructed in the first place, and how it may be possible to imagine different 
geopolitical arrangements. As Dalby (1998: 312) writes, “this is the stuff of critical 
geopolitics”  
6.2) Methods
My methods largely consist of a critical reading of political geography theory and 
secondary literature on Morocco. Although I spent 2 months in Morocco in the summer 
of 2008, this time was dedicated to intensive coursework in Modern Standard Arabic and 
not to fieldwork. My intention in this thesis is to explore the theoretical and conceptual 
terrain as a process leading toward the development of a framework ideally suited to a 
future fieldwork based critical geopolitics doctoral dissertation on Morocco. 
Again, the central theme of this thesis is an examination of theories and 
concepts. Shurmer-Smith (2002: 12) writes, “The main trouble with theory is that people 
will insist on making such a song and dance about it...but the intention with theory is to 
make thinking easier, not more difficult”. Theories help to define what needs to be 
studied, and in this respect they are very powerful research tools (So, 1990: 11). 
Keeping these statements in mind, the purpose of my discussion of theories and 
concepts is to enable future research. The discussion here serves this purpose by 
furthering my understanding of how conceptions of Morocco have been shaped by 
geographical and historical processes. My goal is to show the ideology and politics 
behind this geographical information.  
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Chapter 7
  
The Local Scale: Applying Critical Geopolitics to the Moroccan 
Nation-State
Before I start the discussion in this section, I want to emphasize that the use of 
critical geopolitics is not intended to be a critique of religion nor any particular policy. It is 
not a plan of action for “development”, change, or conflict resolution. I simply want to 
demonstrate that conventional geographical representations of the Moroccan occupation 
of Western Sahara, language policy, economic policy and immigration policy are not 
necessarily objective.
The goal of this section is to shed light on some of the ideology and politics 
behind the four aspects of the Moroccan nation-state's internal role that I have 
discussed. In these complex situations, there is not one “true” answer. The only constant 
is that complex geographical realities have been reduced to controllable ageographical 
and ahistorical abstractions. 
As I have argued previously, the nation-state centered system of clearly delimited 
territories and boundaries largely defines how the world is understood and represented. 
However, the process of globalization is giving rise to new global geographies that 
increase all types of links (cultural, political, economical, informational) that transcend 
these boundaries. This has undermined the role of state boundaries and has led to the 
deterritorialization and subsequent reterritorialization4 of the world geographic order. 
Nation-states and their boundaries are no longer seen as fixed physical entities. The 
ideas of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are used as metaphors for cultural, 
4 Deterritorialization and reterritorialization both refer to the concept of territoriality. Territoriality is the 
control of space by a particular group for strategic purposes (Agnew, 2000; Sack 1986).  
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social, and spatial change (Paasi, 1999: 69). 
I will use the ideas of deterritorialization and reterritorialization as ways for 
describing cultural, social and spatial change within Morocco. The Moroccan nation-state 
has been in the process of reterritorializing itself since independence from France in 
1956. Two ways in which this is happening is through the militarized occupation of 
Western Sahara and through language policy. The Moroccan nation state is being 
deterritorialized in both its economic policy as well as immigration policy. The way in 
which these four situations are portrayed are not objective geographical realities, but 
rather they are all highly politicized and ideological. 
As Dalby (1999: 147) writes, “specifying the world in particular ways is a 
profoundly political act.” I have chosen to make the distinction between deterritorializing 
processes and reterritorializing processes because it demonstrates that Morocco's place 
(or any nation-state for that matter) in the world geographical order cannot be reduced to 
a sovereign nation-state with clearly delimited boundaries.  
7.1) The Occupation of Western Sahara and Moroccan Language Policy
At first glance, Moroccan language policy and the militarized occupation of 
Western Sahara do not seem to be connected. Language policy, connected to ideas of 
pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, is very much an instrument used to create a Moroccan 
national identity. The militarized occupation of Western Sahara, while it can be seen as 
an effort to secure access to phosphate deposits and fishing grounds off the Western 
Sahara coast, is also an attempt to clearly delimit new national boundaries – to 
reterriorialize. The reasons behind Morocco's decision to invade Western Sahara in 
1975 are linked to an array of reasons (a weak Spanish government, caused in part by 
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the illness of dictator Francisco Franco, a distraction from problems in metropolitan 
Morocco, etc.), but Morocco's continued presence in Western Sahara very much 
revolves around questions of identity. 
I am arguing that identity creation and clearly delimited national boundaries are 
very much part of the same project. Clearly delimited territory is the crucial element in 
joining power to identity. A sovereign nation-state defines and exercises political power 
through the control of a particular territory. National identity is dependent upon territory 
as well because only territory provides tangible evidence of a nation's existence and its 
historical roots. Furthermore, a nation needs clearly delimited territory in order to 
demand its own state (Herb, 1999: 9). The complex geographical realities of the 
occupation of Western Sahara and Moroccan language policy are key in understanding 
that these situations cannot be reduced to simplified, ageographical and ahistorical 
abstractions as they are presented by conventional geopolitics. 
The occupation of the Western Sahara and Moroccan language policy are both 
part of the three pillars of the Moroccan nation-state as listed in the Moroccan 
constitution. These three pillars are as follows (Bensadoun, 2007: 14):
1) The King (al malik or ﻚﻠﳌﺍ)
The monarchy is the primary national and religious symbol of 
Morocco. Along with Islam, it is the unifying factor of the nation-state
2) God (allah or ﷲﺃ)
Morocco is a Muslim and Arab nation-state.
3) The Country (al watan or ﻦﻃﻮﻟﺍ)
The territory of Western Sahara in an inalienable part of Morocco. 
I will discuss the third pillar (The Country) and what it means for Western Sahara 
followed by the second pillar and the first pillar in relation to language policy.
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The Occupation of Western Sahara
As I have written in previous chapters, prior to French colonialism, Morocco was 
a kingdom of amorphous boundaries that grew and shrank in accordance with the 
relative strength of the makhzan. The territories that were under historic influence of the 
makhzan were rarely congruent with boundaries set during independence. But even 
during the colonial era, boundaries were not well-defined. The administrative boundaries 
between France's North African holdings (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) along with the 
AOF (Afrique Occidentale Française or French West Africa) holdings, were not clearly 
delimited in all areas (Kenbib, 1993: 39). It was not until 1900 that the boundaries of 
Western Sahara (formerly the Spanish Sahara) were agreed upon between France and 
Spain (Jensen, 2005: 24; Rezette, 1975: 11). The outlines of these boundaries, which 
were based on lines of latitude and longitude, demonstrate the absence of any reference 
to physical or human geography (Rezette, 1975: 11-23).  
At the time of Moroccan independence in 1956, the combination of some unclear 
French colonial boundaries, some fixed colonial boundaries that ignored features of 
physical and human geography, and Morocco's historic ties to areas that were now 
outside of its formal boundaries, led to speculation of how large a 'Greater Morocco' 
could be. From 1054 until 1125, the Muslim-Berber kingdom of the Almoravids controlled 
what is now Western Sahara, Morocco “proper”, and large portions of the Iberian 
peninsula. It is this historical tie that Morocco cites in its claim over the territory (Rezette, 
1975: 38-42). 
Allal el-Fassi, a prominent member of Morocco's independence movement, 
declared in 1956 that Moroccan territory should include all of the Spanish Sahara, the 
holdings of French Mauritania, and large portions of French Algeria and French Mali 
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(Pennell, 2000: 302). All of these territorial claims were gradually discounted with the 
independence of Mauritania (1960), Algeria (1962), and Mali (1960). However, Morocco 
never relented in its claim to the Spanish Sahara (Jensen, 2005: 25; Liazu, 2007: 325). 
My interpretation of this situation is that Morocco knew if it pressed Spain to 
relinquish colonial territories, that Spain was too weak to put up a sustained fight for its 
territories in northwest Africa. However, when France was decolonizing its territories in 
North and West Africa, it insisted upon the sanctity of borders that it defined. After 
independence, France was the largest foreign aid donor to Morocco by far, and there 
was no way that Morocco wanted to jeopardize this relationship by interfering in French 
decolonization – it had too much to lose. In short, Spain could be pushed around while 
France could not. 
Prior to the discovery of large phosphate deposits (phosphate is an important 
ingredient of chemical fertilizers) in 1968 at Bou Craa, Spain did not consider the 
Spanish Sahara to have any resources that were worth exploiting. A 1974 Spanish 
census (whose accuracy is questionable) estimated the population at approximately 
75,000 native inhabitants, giving the Spanish Sahara a population density of 3.5 
inhabitants per km2. This extremely low population density can be attributed to factors of 
physical geography (Jensen, 2005: 21-27; Pennell, 2000: 334; Rezette, 1975: 26, 27).
Annual rainfall averages in the territory range between 200mm in the north to less than 
10mm in the south, resulting in very sparse vegetation. Relatively little rainfall, combined 
with the lack of easily exploitable subterranean aquifers made broad-scale agriculture 
impossible. Prior to the withdrawal of the Spanish in 1975, the indigenous population 
were nomadic pastoralists, ranging over vast areas in order to find fodder for their animal 
herds. Until large phosphate reserves were found, Spain continued to occupy the 
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territory for reasons of prestige, as well as to lay claim to productive fisheries off the 
coast (Jensen, 2005: 21-27; Pennell, 2000: 334; Rezette, 1975: 26, 27).
Exploitation of the phosphate deposits at Bou Craa began in 1972. These 
deposits are considered some of largest and most easily exploitable in the world. In 
1970, the reserves were estimated at 1.5 billion tons, allowing for the extraction of at 
least 10 million tons per year for the next 100 years (Lalutte, 1977: 8; Rezette, 1975: 32). 
The Spanish colonial government built a 100km long conveyor belt (supposedly the 
longest in the world at that time) from the deposits to the port of Laayoune (Pennell, 
2000: 75). 
In 1973, a militarized movement in the Spanish Sahara, known by the Spanish 
name Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio del Oro (otherwise 
known as the Polisario Front), began a guerilla war with the aim of creating an 
independent Spanish Sahara. They fought with the Spanish from 1973 until Spain's 
withdrawal in 1975, attacking army outposts and continuously sabotaging the phosphate 
ore conveyor belt between Bou Craa and Laayoune. Prior to 1975, both Mauritania and 
Morocco laid claim to the Spanish Sahara. In 1975, the United Nations recommended 
that the Spanish Sahara should be a sovereign nation-state based on the wishes of its 
inhabitants, but it was powerless to enforce this recommendation. Spain, ignoring the 
recommendation of the UN, negotiated to cede the northern two-thirds of its Spanish 
Sahara territory to Morocco and the southern one-third to Mauritania. Mauritania made a 
claim on the Spanish Sahara at the insistence of Spain, which sought to neutralize 
Moroccan claims to the territory and keep the Spanish Sahara within its sphere of 
influence. The former Spanish Sahara became known as Western Sahara from this point 
forward (Bennoune, 1977: 12; Pennell, 2000; 341, 342).
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The Polisario, with backing from Algeria and Libya, was able to fight both the 
Mauritanian and Moroccan armies between 1975 and 1978. In 1976, the Polisario made 
incursions far into Mauritania, attacking the capital at Nouakchott, and disabling the iron-
ore mine at Zouerate (which was Mauritania's sole source of export revenue). By 1978, 
60% of Mauritania's budget was devoted to military spending due to the war. Mauritania, 
unable to bear these costs, withdrew from Western Sahara in 1978 (Bennoune, 1977: 
12; Pennell, 2000: 341, 342)
When the Mauritanian army withdrew in 1978, the Polisario was able to focus its 
attention solely on the Moroccan army. While the Polisario was able to achieve some 
notable successes, it was unable to route Morocco from Western Sahara. By the mid-
1980s, Morocco had constructed a defensive berm, constructed of rock and sand, that 
ran for 2000 kilometers along the entire length of the Western Sahara. It is manned by 
100,000 soldiers, equipped with listening devices and heavily mined to the east. This 
berm protects the phosphate mines at Bou Craa and the administrative capital at 
Laayoune from potential guerilla attacks by the Polisario (Jensen, 2004: 33-50; Pennell, 
2000: 341, 342; Murphy, 2008). For many years after the occupation of Western Sahara, 
the Moroccan government banned all publications with maps that made any distinction 
between it and the former Spanish Sahara. Even a dotted line separating the two 
territories was enough for the publication to be banned (Rekacewicz, 2000). 
In 1991, a cease fire was negotiated by the UN between the Polisario and 
Morocco, ending an 18 year guerilla campaign. At present, the original inhabitants of 
Western Sahara (known as Sahrawi) either live in the Moroccan settler cities that have 
been built on the coast or in refugee camps near Tindouf in Algeria. Part of the 1991 UN 
brokered agreement was a referendum in which voters would decide either for 
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independence or integration with Morocco. The referendum has yet to take place 
because neither side can agree on how voters for the referendum would be registered. 
Due to these delays, the situation has been at an impasse since 1991 (Jensen, 2005: 
14; Murphy, 2008). 
Since the population of Western Sahara was largely nomadic before the 
occupation of the territory by Mauritania and Morocco, and the boundaries determined 
by the Spanish and French in 1900 have no basis in physical or human geography, it is 
difficult to determine who is a “citizen” of Western Sahara. Additionally, Morocco has 
encouraged a great deal of settlement along the coast with people from Morocco 
“proper”.  Therefore, determining how voters are registered is key to influencing which 
way the vote would go. Thus the question of Western Sahara's territorial future hinges 
on defining who its people are. This definition, in turn, hinges on cultural identity, and 
language is central to this. So it is now necessary to examine the geographical and 
historical processes that have formed Moroccan identity through Moroccan language 
policy. 
Language Policy
Behind patriotism and nationalism, there always burns the malignant fiction of 
collectivist identity, that ontological barbed wire with attempts to congregate 
“Peruvians,” “Spaniards,” “French,” “Chinese,” etc., in inescapable and 
unmistakable fraternity. You and I know that these categories are simply abject 
lies that throw a mantle of oblivion over countless diversities and 
incompatibilties... - Mario Vargas Llosa (1998: 170). 
Although the official discourse on national identity has undergone important 
changes in the past 15 years, it has not altered the founding character of the Moroccan 
nation-state (Bensadoun, 2007: 14). Moroccan language policy presents Morocco as an 
“Arab” and Muslim nation-state. While these characteristics are a very important part of 
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Moroccan identity, this viewpoint offers a limited picture of the Moroccan cultural 
landscape. As Mario Vargas Llosa, the Peruvian novelist argues above, identities serve 
to simplify complex realities. The second pillar of the Moroccan constitution represents 
one of these simplifications. 
The second pillar of the Moroccan nation-state is God or allah. This refers to 
Morocco being a Muslim and an Arab nation-state. “Arab” in this sense refers to Arab 
ethnicity. As Amin (1979: 11) writes, the Arab world cannot be reduced to some ethno-
racial phenomenon. Omar (2008) argues that what ties the Arab world together is a 
linguistic link. Therefore, taking the views of Amin and Omar, I use the word “Arab” to 
refer to people who use a dialect of Arabic as their first language. 
Islam is often associated with the Arab world. But the Muslim world and the Arab 
world are not congruent. There are millions of people who practice Islam and do not use 
a dialect of Arabic on a daily basis. Likewise, there are smaller number, but still 
significant number of people who speak an Arabic dialect and do not practice Islam 
(Amin, 1978: 11; Haeri, 2004: 80). The reason why Arabic and Islam are so closely 
linked is that the Quran, or Muslim holy book, is written in Classical Arabic. The Quran is 
said to have been sent to earth directly from God as a series of revelations to the 
prophet Muhammed. Classical Arabic is conferred a natural superiority due to God's 
word being transmitted through it (Maddy-Weitzman, 2007: 51; Said, 2004). For this 
reason, Classical Arabic and Islam are inseparable. 
When the Moroccan constitution states that Morocco is a Muslim and Arab 
nation-state, it refers to this close relationship between Classical Arabic and Islam. Since 
language is one of the most important factors in the formation of identity, speaking 
Arabic in Morocco is equal to being an “Arab.” Through this reasoning, religion, language 
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and ethnicity have been conflated. To understand why the Moroccan constitution calls 
Morocco an “Arab” nation-state beyond Classical Arabic's ties to Islam, it is important to 
understand the linguistic situation of Morocco. 
Morocco, like other nation-states in North Africa, finds itself in a very complex 
linguistic situation. According to Marley (2004: 26-29), three versions of Arabic 
(Classical, colloquial, and Modern Standard) are used, and Amazigh (aka Berber) is 
widely spoken (which in itself has three major divisions within Morocco and varies 
greatly between locales). French, implanted during the colonial era, retains an incredibly 
important role. The role of Spanish, while still important in particular areas, is dwindling 
in the former Spanish zones of influence and does not compete for primacy the way in 
which Arabic and French do.
Arabic was brought to the Maghreb by a series of migrations of Arabic-speaking 
people from the Arabian peninsula beginning approximately 1400 years ago (Marley, 
2004a: 26). These migrations have had a significant effect on the linguistic situation. 
That three different versions of Arabic used in Morocco is typical of all other places 
where Arabic is used on a daily basis. Classical Arabic in Morocco (as it is in other 
Arabic-speaking places), is used mostly for religious purposes and is not normally 
spoken outside of religious contexts. Classical Arabic has been kept static over time by 
the Quran, and thus has been relegated to mostly religious usage. It is a first language 
of no one, and only individuals that achieve a high degree of religious learning are able 
to master it in both its written and spoken forms. Classical Arabic is the linguistic model 
to which all other versions of Arabic are compared to (Said, 2004). 
Modern Standard Arabic is a language derived from Classical Arabic. All non-
religious materials are written in Modern Standard Arabic such as newspapers, books 
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and the like. It also serves as a common language between speakers of mutually 
unintelligble Arabic dialects. Because Modern Standard Arabic is derived from Quranic 
Arabic, it is held in very high esteem. Like Quranic Arabic, it is a first language of no one, 
and only individuals that devote a great deal of time and effort to its study are able to 
master it in both its written and spoken forms (Marley, 2004a: 28; Said, 2004). 
Modern Standard Arabic as a language is incredibly interesting in the fact that it 
has been revived from the extinct Ancient Standard Arabic. Ancient Standard Arabic, 
based on Quranic Arabic was a literary medium for mediaeval Arabic cultures. It 
experienced a long decline in usage for about 600 years between approximately 
between 1200 and 1800 AD. One of the reasons Ancient Standard Arabic fell out of use 
is because when spoken it is stilted, antique, and unusable for daily life (Blau, 1981: 2; 
Said, 2004). 
During the Arabic Renaissance (circa 1800), groups of men in the Levant (today's 
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel/Palestine), adapted Ancient Standard Arabic to reflect 
the needs of contemporary use. Through the introduction of new terms, significant 
changes in phraseology, and minor syntactical changes, Ancient Standard Arabic gave 
rise to what is known today as Modern Standard Arabic. Modern Standard Arabic came 
into widespread use during the nineteenth century. Ancient Standard Arabic makes up 
approximately 60% of Modern Standard Arabic today (Blau, 1981: 2; Said, 2004). 
It is rare that languages which fall out of use for such a long period of time are 
revived (Blau, 1981: 2). This revival is considered a miracle among the proponents of 
Modern Standard Arabic. Taimur (cited in Blau: 1980) writes: 
There is no doubt that the survival of the 'pure language' [Classical Arabic] in this 
way is almost deemed a miracle in the world of languages, but it is a miracle 
made possible by natural causes. 
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The “natural causes” that Taimur mentions refers to the belief that divine intervention had 
a hand in the revival of Modern Standard Arabic. While Modern Standard Arabic varies a 
great deal from Classical Arabic, this statement reflects the high esteem in which 
Modern Standard Arabic is held. 
While there are no communities of native speakers of Classical or Modern 
Standard Arabic, they are the languages of Islam, the Moroccan nation-state and pan-
Arab nationalism (Haeri, 2000: 64). Colloquial Arabic, on the other hand, is the language 
of everyday use, spoken in informal contexts by uneducated and educated people alike. 
There is a great deal of difference in vocabulary, grammar and phonology  between 
colloquial Moroccan Arabic and Classical and Modern Standard Arabic. Moroccans, like 
most Arabic speakers, see their colloquial forms as “deviant” and “impure” or not even 
as true languages. In everyday usage, Modern Standard Arabic is considered to be 
more formal and polite (Marley, 2004a: 27-28; Said, 2004). 
There is a great amount of regional variation present in the colloquial Arabic used 
throughout Morocco (Marley, 2004a: 27-28; Said, 2004; Yacine, 1993: 225). But one 
characteristic that all colloquial Moroccan varieties of Arabic share is a high degree of 
influence from Amazigh (or Berber) languages. Classical Arabic, Modern Standard 
Arabic, and the Arabic language forerunners of colloquial Moroccan Arabic from the 
Arabian peninsula, are distinguished by their marked pronunciation of each syllable 
contained in a word. Colloquial Moroccan Arabic is distinguished by “consonant 
clusters,” which when spoken results in a string of syllables spoken with the absence of 
vowels. This trait is shared with Amazigh languages indigenous to North Africa and it 
reflects this influence that Amazigh languages have had on colloquial Moroccan Arabic 
(Shakyrih: 2008). 
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It is estimated that 40 percent of the Moroccan population speaks an Amazigh 
language (Yacine, 1993: 25). Despite this large proportion, Amazigh speakers are 
confined mainly to  three areas: the Rif Mountains in the north, the three ranges of the 
Atlas Mountains (Middle, High and Anti) and the steppe grasslands directly south of the 
Atlas ranges (Marley, 2004: 27; Silverstein and Crawford, 2004: 47). There are three 
main varieties of Tamazigh5 spoken in Morocco and like the colloquial varieties of Arabic 
used in Morocco, they differ greatly among locales. These dialects are not all mutually 
comprehensible (Redouane, 1998: 195; Shakyrih, 2008). 
The presence of Amazigh languages in Morocco has been verified as far back as 
5,000 years ago. When Arabic speaking people from the Arabian peninsula brought 
Islam to Morocco, Imazighen6 people adopted Islam but not the Arabic language. 
Despite the long history of Amazigh languages in Morocco and the Imazighen adoption 
of Islam, Amazigh languages are considered to be the languages of backward peasants 
by many non-Tamazigh speakers (Marley: 2004: 27). With this statement of how 
Amazigh languages are viewed in Morocco, it is important to remember that any 
language when compared to Classical Arabic (or its derivative, Modern Standard Arabic) 
are considered to be inferior because of the religious significance accorded to Classical 
and Modern Standard Arabic. 
Both Tamazigh and Arabic languages have been present long enough to be 
considered indigenous (Redouane, 1998: 195,196). As Silverstein and Crawford (2004: 
47) demonstrate, there are large areas of Morocco where both Arabic and Berber are 
used side-by-side. The influence that Tamazigh has had on Moroccan Arabic is 
significant as mentioned above. Linguistic evidence points to a large degree of mixing 
5 Tamizigh is the word used to refer to Amazigh languages. 
6 Imazighen is the plural form of Amazigh
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between Amazigh and Arab populations; therefore, the line between “Amazigh” and 
“Arabic” speakers in Morocco cannot always be easily defined. 
Language is one of the primary factors in the formation of identity (Kollosov: 
2008). Therefore, it is not always easy to distinguish between a person who is “Amazigh” 
and a person who is “Arab.” But French colonial policies did attempt to make just such a 
clear distinction using the 'divide and rule' tactic common to European colonialism. The 
French, informed by their earlier colonial venture in Algeria, used sociological differences 
and religious disparities between the two groups to create an image of a “good” Amazigh 
culture in opposition to a “bad” Arab culture (Davis, 2007: 57). From a French colonial 
viewpoint, Arabs could never be candidates for assimilation because Islamism, 
communism, nomadism and polygamy were inherent parts of Arab society. On the other 
hand Imazighen were portrayed only as superficially Islamicized and had a social 
structure that was considered to be very “European” (Davis, 2007: 62; 97-98; Hoisington, 
1995: 71; Maddy-Weitzman, 2007: 57). 
The Moroccan nationalist movement in the 1950s, under the direction of the 
Istiqlal party, viewed Amazigh cultural identity as a colonial invention designed to 
fragment Morocco. Even though Muslim Amazigh dynasties have controlled Morocco at 
several points since the arrival of Islam, the official version of Moroccan national identity 
continues to be based on a conflation of the Arabic language, Islamic legitimacy and 
Arab ethnicity. This Arabo-Islamist ideology is based upon ideas of Arab nationalism 
imported from Egypt and Lebanon (Silverstein and Crawford, 2004: 44). 
 Although official versions of Moroccan national identity based upon Arabo-
Islamist ideology, the national government has taken steps in recent years to 
acknowledge the importance of Amazigh language and culture in Morocco. Perhaps the 
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most significant step has been the creation of a state-funded Amazigh language and 
culture institute in 2001, known by its French acronym IRCAM (l'Institute Royal de la 
Culture Amazighe) . Regardless of this gesture, it is viewed unfavorably by some 
because it is seen as creating an “official” version of Amazigh identity at the expense of 
other narratives - namely by creating a distinct divide between Amazigh and Arab worlds 
and not recognizing the significant influence they have had upon each other. (Sharkyrih, 
2008; Silverstein and Crawford, 2004). 
While Amazigh and Arabic are both important in the politics and ideology in the 
creation of identity in Morocco, the French language continues to have a great deal of 
utility more than 50 years after the end of French rule. Despite an official policy of 
Arabization within Morocco, French is more widely used today in some ways than it was 
during the colonial era. Since independence, the role of French has evolved. It has lost 
its dominance in certain areas of public life, such as the state education system, but it 
has retained its dominant role in finance, industry, science and a large portion of the 
media - this is in part due to geographical and historical ties to France created during the 
colonial era (Marley, 2004b: 66; Yacine, 1993: 226).
Due to these factors, proficiency in French is considered necessary for almost 
any career in Morocco. While French was rejected in the early years after independence 
as a language of colonial oppression, it is now seen as the language of modernity and 
the future. Most Arabic-French bilinguals are in favor of maintaining the use of French in 
Morocco, despite being ideologically committed to Arabization (Marley, 2004b: 65, 66). 
When Morocco achieved independence in 1956, it chose an official language 
policy that recognized and supported Modern Standard Arabic only (Marley, 2004b: 25). 
This policy sought to restore the “role and place” of Arabic following the French and 
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Spanish Protectorates. Colloquial Arabic, Amazigh, French and Spanish were simply 
ignored. This situation changed slightly in 2000 with an educational reform, and then 
with the establishment of IRCAM in 2001, which recognize the important roles other 
languages play in Morocco. However, the ultimate goal is still to create a nation-state 
whose defining characteristics are Arabo-Islamic (Marley, 2002; Marley, 2007: 25; 
Yacine, 1993: 229).   
This monolithic language policy was very much inspired by ideas of European 
nationalism (Burke, 2000: 28; Grandguillame, 1994: 4). As stated in Chapter 6, 
metropolitan France attempted to erase regional differences by allowing only one 
version of French to be taught and spoken in schools, thereby eliminating (in theory) the 
use of regional patois and non-French languages (such as Basque). 
The monolithic language policy implemented in post-independence Morocco cast 
colloquial varieties of Arabic and Amazigh languages in the same light as French patois 
and non-French languages for France - they were considered degenerate forms of a 
“pure” language. In this case, the pure language is Modern Standard Arabic. This policy 
of non-recognition of difference has caused some of the same problems that French 
colonial language policy had caused, like the favoring of a language that is not used by 
most people on a daily basis (Grandguillame, 1997: 4-11). 
Official documents and statements in Morocco have focused the importance of 
eliminating the use of French in order to reinforce the Arabo-Islamic characteristics of 
the nation-state (known as Arabization). However, this official position is theoretical and 
divorced from reality. At present, the Moroccan government faces a dilemma of having 
educational and economic needs being dependent upon the French language and the 
nationalistic objective of establishing a completely Arabized Morocco (Yacine, 1993: 
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230). 
In the larger view, the Moroccan nation-state is not unusual in promoting a 
monolithic language policy. Taylor writes, “All states, whatever their cultural make-up are 
assumed to be nation-states and carry out internal policies accordingly. The world 
consists of 200 cultural containers...within which national ideals are being reproduced in 
schooling, the mass media, and all manner of other social institutions” (1994: 156). 
Kollosov, expanding upon Taylor's idea, argues that nation-states manufacture both 
political and ethnic identities (2003: 58). This statement stands in direct contrast with 
modernization theory, which holds that “modern” nations arise from pre-existing cultural 
groups - nation-states are not responsible for manufacturing them (Burke, 2000: 27). 
Language is considered one of the most powerful markers of identity. The rise of the 
nation-state is associated with attempts to force a standardized form of the national 
language on speakers of dialects or even other languages (Kollosov, 2003: 257).  
The first pillar of the Moroccan nation state is The King or al malik. The king, 
along with Islam is the unifying factor of the nation-state. The Moroccan king claims 
descent from the Islamic prophet Muhammed. Therefore the king is seen as a religious 
authority and has a sacred personality that is inviolable and uncontestable (Pennell, 
1993: 211). It is not the goal of this thesis to discuss at length the nuances of the 
Moroccan political system, but the important thing to realize is that Moroccan identity as 
articulated by the three pillars of the Moroccan constitution are very much tied up with 
meanings of Islam and how these meanings connect to ethnicity and therefore language. 
The standardization of the practice of Islam and and the centralization of Moroccan royal 
authority can be seen as parallels to the language example. 
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7.2) Reterritorialized Analysis:
I am arguing that the creation of a clearly delimited territory and a national 
identity are part of the same project. Geography is about power and political geography 
is about the use of power to fix and control territory (Allen, 2003: 95). In Morocco, the 
occupation of Western Sahara is an effort to clearly delimit national boundaries or fix 
territorial space through the redefinition of an identity. Moroccan language policy plays a 
significant roles in defining this identity, too. As Dalby (1999: 134) writes, it is necessary 
to understand that boundaries and identities are contingent upon one another. 
  Again, it is difficult to point to exactly one reason why Morocco invaded Western 
Sahara in 1975. There are many reasons why Western Sahara was invaded and 
continues to be occupied. The salient point here is that Morocco's continued control over 
the territory of Western Sahara is linked to identity. 
In linking Western Sahara to the idea of the idealized nation-state, the fact that 
Western Sahara can only become its own nation-state or part of another nation-state is 
interesting. This reasoning maintains that all individuals should belong to a nation and 
have a national identity, and that state citizenship and clearly demarcated nation-states 
are the fulfillment of an historical destiny. This viewpoint has become central in defining 
not only our world views, but also human identities (Paasi, 1999: 69). This reasoning 
underlies how the UN addresses the issue of Western Sahara. 
Wishful thinking by the UN assumed that much of the issue of voter registration 
could be addressed by experts and informed argument leading to an outcome that fully 
satisfied both parties. Morocco and the Polisario knew better than this. They realized 
that the conflict of the Western Sahara can never be settled through a winner-take-all 
referendum fully acceptable to both. The Polisario remains committed to an electoral roll 
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based on the Spanish colonial census of 1974, with the addition of perhaps 10,000 
individuals that may have been missed by the Spanish census takers. Morocco, on the 
other hand has no intentions of agreeing to a referendum with only the choices of 
integration or independence on terms that would limit their definition of what constituted 
a Sahrawi individual. Each time negotiations take place between the Polisario and 
Morocco, Morocco attempts to add names to the electoral roll, which the Polisario finds 
unacceptable. The names that Morocco attempts to add are individuals that Morocco 
has resettled along the coast from metropolitan Morocco (Jensen, 2005: 45-47; Murphy, 
2008). In Morocco's effort to control the Western Sahara, it wants to define a Sahrawi 
identity, which in turn is informed by the state-constructed and homogenous Moroccan 
identity. The Polisario makes its claim for legitimacy by arguing that the Sahrawi identity 
is distinct from the Moroccan identity. Both groups are portraying their versions of 
identity as primordial and homogenous. In reality, identity is not so easily simplified. 
Conventional geopolitical thinking uproots difference in multi-ethnic societies by 
demanding allegiance to a singular national identity within a clearly demarcated territory. 
From this viewpoint, identity is something that is primordial, fixed and homogenous. 
However, identities are not primordial, but constructed through systems of cultural 
representation. Homogeneity is a myth because most contemporary nation-states 
consist of disparate cultures that were only unified by an active effort of identity 
construction. By homogenizing national identity, the state attempts to define exactly who 
can be part of the nation, as well as fixing its territorial boundaries of the state in which it 
can claim sovereignty. The social construction of national identity is inherently tied to 
territory (Newman, 1999: 13; Rygiel, 1998: 106). There is a deep-seated contradiction 
between the cultural pluralism of nation-states and the investment of power into the idea 
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of a single, hegemonic nation along with the use of this 'ideal nation' to justify the state's 
existence (Penrose and Mole, 2008: 79). 
The boundaries of Morocco and Moroccan identity are not “hard truths, material 
realities and irrepressible facts”, but rather they are highly politicized and ideological 
geographical information created by conventional geopolitics. At first glance, the 
occupation of Western Sahara and language policy do not seem to be related, but 
ultimately these two factors are tied together by official definitions of identity. Economic 
policy is closely tied to immigration in a similar fashion as immigration takes place largely 
because of Morocco's economic situation. Thus I turn my attention to these two 
deterritorializing themes in the next two successive sections of the chapter. 
 
7.3) Economic Policy and Immigration  
Moroccan economic policy and its immigration situation have been greatly 
influenced by factors originating outside of Morocco. Neoliberal policies, which are 
derived from modernization theory, have influenced Moroccan economic policy since the 
early 1980s at the behest of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), its 
primary creditors. In exchange for continued support from these and other creditors, 
Morocco has significantly restructured its economy by curtailing state spending and 
eliminating protective tariffs for its products. From this perspective, economic policy has 
been deterritorialized. 
Morocco is both a sender of migrants to Europe and serves as a way station for 
migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to the European Union. The complexity of the 
situation is compounded by EU immigration policies and is not separable from the 
economic situation. Morocco is portrayed in economic policies and practices by the 
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World Bank, IMF, and EU in a simplified reality. Immigration is viewed in a similar light by 
the EU. But complex geographies underlie both of these situations. Just as the 
occupation of Western Sahara and language policy are linked through the construction 
of identity, economic policy and immigration policy are linked through Western 
viewpoints on the world. Due to the complexity of Moroccan economic policy and the 
immigration situation and factors far beyond the nation-state's control, both are 
processes that have largely been deterritorialized. 
As I have argued, the colonial experience created Morocco as a European 
periphery. This peripheral status has continued up until the present. Although Morocco 
has introduced the IMF's economic reforms (structural adjustment) starting in 1983, it 
has not benefited from economic growth fast enough or consistently enough to move out 
of the periphery. For example, the number of people living in poverty increased from 3.4 
million in 1991 (13 percent of the population) to 5.3 million in 1999 (19 percent of the 
population). In 1990-1995, an annual average of 1.5 percent of the population was 
undernourished. In 1999-2001, the share was 2.1 percent. Morocco also suffers from 
mass unemployment, which is a key indicator of economic failure (Rivlin, 2007; Seddon, 
2000: 211). 
Morocco's continued place in the periphery can largely be attributed to a “hub 
and spoke” relationship that it (along with Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) have with the 
European Union. In 2003, the EU was responsible for 75 percent of Morocco's exports 
and 64 percent of its imports. In contrast, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya took only 1.4 
percent of Morocco's exports and supplied only 2.2 percent of Morocco's imports. In this 
case, the EU is the hub and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya are the spokes. In a 
hub and spoke economic relationship, spokes have less access to markets other than 
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the hub. The hub has preferential access to all spokes, whereas a spoke has preferential 
access to the hub only. A spoke nation-state can avoid this and become a hub by 
entering into bilateral and regional trade agreements. Morocco has attempted this with 
other North African countries by entering into regional trade pacts with Algeria, Tunisia 
and Libya (such as the establisment of the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA) in 1989). 
However these initiatives have yet to be effective, and very low intraregional trade 
between the countries of North Africa has resulted. If the colonial experience created 
Morocco as a European periphery, its hub and spoke relationship with the EU 
perpetuates this situation (Rivlin, 2007: 204; Seddon, 2000; 217-225).
It is argued that core countries enjoy unequal power relationships over countries 
in the semi-periphery and periphery because of the way in which the world economy is 
structured. Because the world economy is structured unfairly in ways that result in the 
core economically exploiting the semi-periphery and periphery, core countries do not 
have to engage in the overt use of force in order to see their interests prevail (Painter, 
2007: 62; Taylor, 1993: 37). The hub and spoke example given above could be 
considered one of these structures in which the European Union has power over 
Morocco. 
When the World Bank and IMF required countries to make their economies more 
competitive both internally and externally, it was assumed that they would be given fair 
access to foreign markets. This has not happened with Morocco in relation to the 
European Union. As a result of neoliberal economic structural adjustment, Morocco 
eliminated subsidies for agricultural products in an attempt to make its agricultural 
products more competitive on the international market. This happened at the same time 
as the reduction in protective tariffs that would protect Moroccan agricultural products 
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domestically. The European Union, due to its place as part of the world's core, did not 
borrow heavily from the IMF and World Bank and was largely immune from any eternally 
imposed economic restructuring and as a result, it was able to continue subsidizing its 
agricultural exports unabated. This has had the effect of limiting agricultural imports from 
outside of the EU (Rivlin, 2007: 213). In short, the EU has been able to protect its 
agricultural sector, while Morocco has not. Additionally, 40 percent of Morocco's labor 
force is engaged in agriculture in contrast to the EU's 6 percent. Therefore, economic 
policies dealing with agriculture have a much greater impact in Morocco than in the EU 
(Gold, 2000: 133). 
In the early 1980s, the European Union (at that time known as the EEC or 
European Economic Community), began focusing on the inclusion of Spain and Portugal 
into the union. Spain and Portugal, due to physical geography, share a similar 
Mediterranean climate with that of Morocco. Therefore, they produce similar agricultural 
export crops as Morocco such as citrus fruit, grapes, and olives. Prior to the inclusion of 
Spain and Portugal into the EU, Moroccan agricultural products enjoyed similar market 
access to European markets as Spain and Portugal. But once Spain and Portugal 
became part of the EU in January 1986, EU policies began heavily subsidizing 
Portuguese and Spanish agricultural products while at the same time, implementing 
protectionist measures for them. This had the effect of severely limiting Morocco's 
access to European markets. Morocco in turn has begun to import artificially cheap 
agricultural products from the European Union with a negative effect on domestic 
employment and the Moroccan government's ability to generate revenue to pay back its 
external debts (Bahaijoub, 1993: 236; Rivlin, 2007: 213; Seddon, 2000; 209; White, 
2007: 700). Since Morocco has had difficulty developing significant trade relationships 
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with partners other than the European Union, it cannot change its status as a spoke to 
the EU and remains in the periphery of the world system. 
In short, I have argued that Morocco's place in the world system can be attributed 
largely to external factors. It is not the presence of “traditionalism” which has hindered 
Morocco's development. Morocco's status as a periphery to Europe began formally with 
the establishment of French colonialism in 1912, and this situation is perpetuated today 
due to Morocco's unequal economic relationship with the European Union. Neoliberal 
economic policies that Morocco has been forced to implement have allowed the EU a 
competitive advantage in agricultural products. 
While Morocco is part of the periphery, parts of it are thoroughly integrated with 
Europe, while other parts are truly peripheral. Friedmann's model of the internal core-
periphery and my discussion of ideas of “islands of development” taken from the world-
cities hypothesis become useful tools in envisioning uneven development. Morocco has 
attempted to improve its economic situation, like through the creation of regional trade 
organizations such as the UMA. It also applied to the European Union in 1987. This 
application was deferred by the EU on the basis that Morocco is not a European nation-
state (Bahaijoub, 240: 1993). 
As I have stated before, Morocco's economic situation is not separable from its 
immigration situation. I therefore discuss immigration in my next segment. 
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Immigration: 
 Presently, mass unemployment within Morocco has resulted in many Moroccans 
leaving for Europe, where it is believed that there are jobs and the possibility of higher 
earnings. In 2003, it was estimated that there were some 2.5 million Moroccans living 
outside of Morocco, with the vast majority living in Europe. Legal immigration to the EU 
has been limited in recent years, and as a result, illegal immigration has become much 
more significant (Rivlin, 2007: 205). 
Moroccan patterns of immigration to Europe began in World War I when the 
French government sent nearly 400,000 North African colonial subjects to France either 
as soldiers, factory workers, or agricultural laborers. In the 1950s and 1960s, Morocco 
(along with other Mediterranean nation-states, like Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia) had bilateral immigration agreements with European 
countries that imported labor. Between 1973 and 1985, these bilateral agreements were 
slowly discontinued and European countries began to act unilaterally, gradually 
developing complex systems of immigration control that were imposed on Mediterranean 
nation-states sending migrants (Malgensini, 1993: 26; Pastore, 2002: 106-109; White, 
2007: 703). 
At first, European countries acted alone in these policies, but as the European 
Union evolved into a more powerful political entity, governments began coordinating their 
immigration control and policy through the EU political and legal framework. The 
introduction of visa regimes (even for short stays), making air and sea carriers liable for 
transporting undocumented migrants, and the use of strong diplomatic pressures on the 
countries of origin for the repatriation of illegal migrants became the core of EU 
immigration policies. As a result of these more stringent immigration policies, starting in 
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the 1970s, there has been a growth in the “illegality” of immigration. These unilateral 
policies have not been well-received in Morocco since their implementation began in the 
1970s. This is due to the fact that worker remittances sent from Morocco to Europe are 
an important part of the Moroccan economy (Malgensini, 1993: 26; Pastore, 2002: 106-
109; White, 2007: 703). 
In the 1960s, the export of labor from Morocco to Europe became one of the 
major features of the dependency relationship Morocco has with Europe. By 1973, 
worker's remittances accounted for 23 percent of Moroccan exports (Seddon, 2000: 
208). In other words, exported Moroccan labor in Europe accounted for almost one 
quarter of export earnings in 1973 (if labor is considered as an export). By 2001, 
Morocco ranked fourth in the world in remittances (White, 2007: 702). The Moroccan 
government supports migration for both political and economic reasons. Migration is 
seen a safety valve to decrease poverty, and hence decrease political tensions within 
Morocco. Migrants are also seen as relieving pressures on the labor market and 
providing an important source of foreign currency (de Haas and Plug, 2006: 608).  
Morocco is a part of one of the principle North-South migration routes from sub-
Saharan Africa into the European Union, due to its close proximity to Europe (Collyer, 
2007: 669). Carling (2007: 12) writes that sub-Saharan African migrants come mostly 
from countries in West Africa, but a significant number of migrants are coming from 
Central Africa also. It is astonishing that the migrants' origins are so diverse. This 
indicates that the idea of traveling to Europe through Morocco has become established 
in most of West and Central Africa. The primary factor driving migrants from sub-
Saharan Africa to Europe is economic. Income in Europe, however menial, is usually 10-
15 times higher than what could be earned in sub-Saharan Africa – assuming that formal 
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employment is able to be found in sub-Saharan Africa (Gold, 2000: 133). 
Long, fragmented journeys characterize migration from West or Central Africa to 
Morocco. This type of migration is often referred to as transit migration. Transit migrants 
in Morocco neither originate, nor intend to stay, in North Africa. They are passing 
through on their way to Europe, but may end up staying in Morocco for an extended 
period.  Transit migrants are usually clandestine migrants who deliberately avoid all 
forms of border control because they lack proper travel documentation (i.e. passports 
and visa). Standard practices of international travel (such as air travel) became more 
difficult starting in the 1990s without proper documentation. Therefore, clandestine 
overland migration is now one of the only ways in which migrants can reach Europe 
without proper documentation (Collyer, 2007: 671, 672; Carling, 4-9). 
The reason why Morocco is significant in this picture is that it serves as a place of 
waiting for sub-Saharan Africans on their way to the European Union through Spain. It is 
important to note that Spain was not a final destination for migrants until about two 
decades ago, but a changing economic climate in Spain has created a demand for 
migrant labor. Prior to these changes in Spain, it was France and Italy that were often 
considered final destinations. Borders throughout West, Central and North Africa are 
relatively porous and lightly patrolled until migrants reach Morocco. Morocco is only 14 
kilometers from Spain across the Straits of Gibraltar, and it is this boundary with the 
European Union that is heavily patrolled by both Moroccan and European security 
forces. Therefore, Morocco has become a place of waiting for sub-Saharan Africans on 
their way to the EU (Collyer, 2007: 671, 672; Carling, 2007: 4-9, Malgesini, 1993: 27). 
Routes that migrants take to Morocco on their way to the European Union are 
incredibly diverse. For many migrants that use these routes to North Africa, their 
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destination is not determined when they leave home and it may change many times 
during the course of a journey. Most migrants rarely leave their places of origin with 
enough money to make the entire journey, therefore their journeys are fragmented as 
they stop in order to earn enough money (or wait to be sent money from friends and 
relatives) for onward travel. For these reasons, transit migration from West and Central 
Africa to the European Union is chaotic and disordered, with a great deal of uncertainty 
at every stage  (Collyer, 2007: 669-681; Carling, 2007: 14). 
Collyer, interviewing 142 transit migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Morocco at 
the end of 2005, found that they had spent an average of more than 15 months waiting 
for a chance to go to Spain. These long wait times in Morocco have become part of the 
journey only recently. During the late 1990s, migrants could pass easily into the Spanish 
cities of Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco's northern coast in order to gain access to 
mainland Spain because the only border controls were at official crossing points. With 
the concern that illegal migrants were using Ceuta and Melilla to gain access to Europe, 
fences were constructed around both cities at the end of 1999. They are double fences, 
4 meters high, equipped with motion sensors and topped with razor wire, at a total cost 
of $60 million. Without access to the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, migrants were forced 
to cross the Mediterranean illegally (meaning without proper documentation). Increased 
patrols by both the Spanish and Moroccan naval forces from 2004 onwards have made 
the illegal sea crossing incredibly difficult. (Collyer, 2007: 681-684). 
Within the European Union, individuals can pass from member state to member 
state without having documents checked at border crossings. This policy started with the 
implementation of the Schengen agreement in 1995 (Gold, 2000: 33). Therefore, once 
an individual reaches an EU member state (whether legally or legally), he or she can 
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then move anywhere within the Schengen zone of the EU7. Within Spain, Spanish law 
stipulates that illegal migrants, once caught, can be detained for a maximum of 40 days. 
If the Spanish authorities are unable to to identify and/or repatriate migrants to their 
country of origin during this period, they must be released. Therefore, if an individual is 
able to keep their country of origin from Spanish authorities while they are being 
detained, they are released into Spain, even though they lack legal documentation. 
Once they are released in Spanish territory, they can move anywhere freely within the 
Schengen zone of the European Union without documents. This scenario has happened 
with tens of thousands of immigrants annually in recent years (Carling, 2007: 7; Gold, 
2000: 131). 
 Morocco is considered a “buffer zone” of the EU beyond its official boundaries. 
The European integration process has created a geographical entity that depends on the 
integrity of its external boundaries. The Shengen agreement of 1985 expresses the idea 
of “Fortress Europe” and assigns countries with Mediterranean borders the task of 
regulating the entry of labor foreign to the EU. This has had serious impacts on migration 
to, from and through the states immediately outside the external borders of the 
Schengen zone. The EU has begun delegating responsibilities to these buffer states. 
This has had the effect of externalizing migration policy in order to prevent migrants from 
even reaching the borders of the Schengen zone (Carling, 2007: 9; Collyer, 2007: 670; 
Malgesini, 2007: 27). 
The European Union is reliant upon inexpensive labor from Morocco and to a 
lesser extent, sub-Saharan Africa. Once Moroccan and sub-Saharan African migrants 
reach Europe, they often work in menial jobs at below minimum wage. They generate 
7 Not all countries of the European Union have ratified the Schengen agreement. Therefore, freedom of 
movement within the European Union applies only to countries of the Schengen zone, not the entire 
EU. 
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very few social costs, because they are not eligible for benefits normally granted to 
citizens of the EU (i.e. unemployment benefits). Migrant workers in Europe could be 
considered a “subsidy” to many enterprises that would otherwise be unable to turn a 
profit without their inexpensive labor (Malgesini, 1993: 28). 
7.4) Deterritorialized Analysis
Neoliberal thought has had a great deal of influence on Moroccan economic 
policy. The reduction of subsidies and the removal of protection from domestic markets 
have been adopted by Morocco so that it can have continued support from its main 
creditors: the World Bank and IMF. While it is impossible to know what Morocco's 
economic situation would be today without the implementation of neoliberal policies, they 
do reveal how Morocco is perceived by the “West” through the critiques of modernization 
theory/neoliberal thought. Again, neoliberal thought has connective tissue with 
modernization theory. Modernization theory is much more than an explanation of 
underdevelopment; it expresses an entire system of Western (First World/Core) attitudes 
towards the world, and these attitudes persist in neoliberalism (Peet, 1999: 84-85; Slater, 
2004: 87). 
Morocco's economic situation, characterized by high rates of unemployment, is 
the primary factor that pushes migrants to leave Morocco. The lack of formal sector 
employment in sub-Saharan Africa is also cited as the primary cause for migrants 
leaving sub-Saharan Africa. The freedom of movement within Europe created by the 
Schengen agreement has had the effect of creating tightly guarded boundaries to entry 
points of the European Union. This has not only affected territories adjoining the inside 
of these boundaries (Spain) but also territories on the adjoining the outside of these 
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boundaries (Morocco). 
As Seddon (2000: 223) observes, the “Free Market” does not apply to Moroccan 
(and sub-Saharan African) labor going into the EU, but investments and exports 
(including tourists) may flow freely into Morocco. This point highlights a wider pattern of 
the world economy in which capital and goods can move freely, while labor cannot 
(Friedmann, 1986). Due to EU measures taken to protect agriculture within its 
boundaries, Moroccan migrants have and will continue to be used in Europe to cultivate 
the very agricultural products that Morocco is unable to export to Europe (White, 2001: 
48). This point illustrates structural power relations between nation-states adopting 
neoliberal economic policies and ones that do not. Nation-states borrowing from the 
World Bank and IMF are forced to open their markets to imports and cut subsidies, while 
nation-states (or supra-national entities like the EU) that do not borrow from the World 
Bank and IMF are able to protect certain sectors of their economies, like agriculture, 
through protective tariffs and generous subsidies.
At the center of the EU/Moroccan immigration relationship is a question of 
identity. The EU has clearly delineated between “Europe” and “non-Europe” with Spain 
and Portugal joining the EU in 1986 and the deferment of Morocco's application in 1987. 
The EU controls the definition of what “European” means. Europe as it is commonly 
known is not an objective reality. It is instead a highly ideological and politicized way of 
seeing the world. 
The fact that Europe is designated a “continent” has all to do with history and 
culture and nothing to do with geography. Geographically, Asia is a land mass in which 
six large peninsulas protrude, these include: Northeast Asia (Siberia), East Asia (China), 
Southeast Asia (Indochina), South Asia (India), West Asia (Arabian Peninsula), and 
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Northwest Asia (Europe). Only Northwest Asia (Europe) is considered a continent in its 
own right. The rest are considered parts of the Asian continent (Lewis and Wigen, 1997). 
This argument shows that the ways in which the world is conventionally perceived, even 
through basic viewpoints such as the “seven continents” is not always objective.
An example of how the EU defines the difference between Europe and non-
Europe can be seen in the way in which Spain views Morocco and its immigrants. Since 
Francisco Franco's death in 1975, Spain has used Morocco as a political antithesis. For 
Spain, Morocco represents an image of its past, which was corrupt, authoritarian, 
backwards, Moorish and Islamic. In contrast to Spanish-speaking and Catholic 
immigrants from Latin America, Morroccan immigrants represent a negative image of the 
past in Spanish culture. Therefore, Moroccans are perceived as a threat to Spanish well-
being and security (White, 2007: 692; Boone and Benco, 1999: 65). Additionally, the 
supposed “clash of civilizations” between the West and Islamic world becomes important 
as Spain and Morocco straddle this imaginary border (Huntington, 1996). For Spanish 
policy makers, being strict on labor migration from Morocco is at the very center of 
Spain's effort to maintain societal security and define itself as part of European space as 
defined by the EU (White, 2007: 692). The definition of Europe and what it means to be 
European is controlled by the EU and its member states in this situation. 
So Morocco is deterritorialized in these two related realms, because it becomes 
an amorphous part of the global economic periphery and the buffer zone of the EU. 
These are examples of the nation-state of Morocco losing control of its territorial integrity 
and the capacity to shape its political identity. Now that I have addressed some aspects 
of political and social change in Morocco, it is time to turn to the conclusion. 
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Conclusion
The range of ideas that have been surveyed necessitates an ambitious 
undertaking for a Masters thesis. However, the approach that I have taken is necessary 
to fulfill my general goal and to make a coherent argument out of my specific goal. The 
general goal of the thesis is an exploration of ideas that will lay the foundation of a future 
doctoral dissertation. The specific goal of the thesis is to apply critical geopolitics to four 
particular aspects of the Moroccan nation-state's role within its own boundaries. 
It was necessary to start the discussion at the sovereign state ideal. This was 
based on my readings of leading political geographers (Agnew, 1994; Taylor, 1994, 
1995; O Tuathail, 1998). These writers point out the fundamental conflict between a 
cleanly bounded and delimited political-territorial state and the reality of what a nation-
state is in a political-geographical sense. While the nation-state continues to be relevant, 
particularly in the context of globalization, there are social, political and economic 
processes that occur outside of it. 
Taylor (1993: 44) describes a model that has three scales: the global, the nation-
state and the local. It is impossible to understand one scale outside of the context of the 
other two. I have incorporated Taylor's model into the structure of my analysis (see 
Figure 6). The global scale is represented by Third World/First World divide, dependency 
theory and the core-periphery model, world systems analysis and the world cities 
hypothesis. The nation-state scale is represented by the examination of the sovereign-
state ideal. The local scale is represented by the four aspects of the Moroccan nation-
state's internal role. 
Although my specific goal applies to the local scale, it cannot be understood 
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outside of the context of the global or nation-state scales. Through the application of 
critical geopolitics to the four aspects of the Moroccan nation-state's internal role, I have 
demonstrated that viewing the world geographic order through the nation-state scale 
only gives, in Taylor's word's, a partial view of the world system which distorts reality into 
a false and limited picture (1993: 44).  
Modernization theory, neoliberal thought and the idea of development have had 
a great amount influence on the way in which the contemporary world is perceived as 
well as how the developed world interacts with the undeveloped world (Peet, 1999). 
These ideas are largely drawn from colonial philosophies (Peet and Watts, 1993). It is 
important to understand that the Moroccan nation-state is largely a construction of 
French (and to a lesser degree Spanish) colonialism, and therefore, without having a 
grasp of Moroccan colonial geography or history, it is impossible to examine the 
contemporary Moroccan nation-state. 
In a world in which the nation state's role is not exactly clear, it is important to 
understand that a nation-state does not a have a monopoly on power within its own 
territorial boundaries. Since decolonization in Morocco was begun by France and Spain 
in 1956, Morocco has reterritorialized itself through the militarized occupation of Western 
Sahara and language policy. Starting in about the mid-1980s, Morocco no longer had 
monopolistic control over its economic policy and immigration situation, meaning that 
these two processes have been deterritorialized. 
As I have shown through the use of critical geopolitics, the ways in which these 
four situations have been portrayed through conventional geopolitical reasoning are not 
always objective, rather these viewpoints are often influenced by ideology and politics. 
Both the Moroccan nation-state and the core of the world system attempt to project by 
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any means necessary, a representation of the world consonant with their vision of reality. 
They do this as part of manufacturing the consent of the governed, to make the status 
quo appear as commonplace and a given through the use of ideology. This process is 
politicized because of hegemonic forces that seek to maintain consensus. These 
hegemonic practices are contested, of course (i.e. through the Amazigh movement). But 
the important point is that particular visions of reality have become dominant (Mitchell, 
2000: 51-53, Cosgrove, 1989: 128). 
94
Figures 
95
Fi
gu
re
 1
. T
he
 F
irs
t, 
S
ec
on
d 
an
d 
Th
ird
 W
or
ld
s 
(a
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 A
gn
ew
 a
nd
 C
or
br
id
ge
, 
   
19
95
; P
le
ts
ch
, 1
98
1:
 5
78
)
96
Fi
gu
re
 2
: C
or
e-
pe
rip
he
ry
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 u
nd
er
 d
ep
en
de
nc
y 
th
eo
ry
 (a
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 W
ill
is
, 2
00
5:
 7
1)
97
Fi
gu
re
 3
: T
he
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
co
re
, s
em
i-p
er
ip
he
ry
   
   
 a
nd
 p
er
ip
he
ry
 (a
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 T
ay
lo
r, 
19
93
: 4
4)
98
Fi
gu
re
 4
: W
or
ld
 d
is
tri
bu
tio
n 
by
 n
at
io
n-
st
at
e 
of
 th
e 
co
re
, s
em
i-p
er
ip
he
ry
 a
nd
 p
er
ip
he
ry
 (a
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 D
ra
kk
ak
is
-S
m
ith
, 2
00
0:
 4
)
99
Fi
gu
re
 5
: T
he
 w
or
ld
 c
ity
 h
ie
ra
rc
hy
 
  
100
F i
gu
re
 6
:  T
he
 G
l o
b a
l a
nd
 L
oc
al
 S
c a
le
s 
i n
c o
rp
or
at
e d
 i n
to
 th
e 
N
a t
io
n-
S
ta
te
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 S
c a
l e
 (b
as
ed
 o
n  
T a
yl
or
 (1
9 9
3 :
 4
4,
 4
5 )
)
Fi
gu
re
 7
: C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
of
 T
ra
di
tio
na
l a
nd
 M
od
er
n 
S
oc
ie
tie
s 
   
   
   
   
   
 (a
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 P
ee
t 1
99
9:
 8
1)
Bibliography
Spanish Sahara Decolonized - But is it Liberated? 1976.  MERIP Reports (44):22.
Ager, D. 1996. Francophonie in the 1990s. Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Limited.
Agnew, J. 1994. The Territorial Trap: the geographical assumptions of of international 
relations theory. Review of International Political Economy 1 (1):53-80.
———. 1995. The Territorial Trap. In Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and 
International Political Economy, eds. J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, 78-100. 
London: Routlege.
———. 2000. Territoriality. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 823-824. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2002. Making Political Geography. New York: Oxford University Press.
Agnew, J., and M. Kuus. 2008. Theorizing the State Geographically: Sovereignty, 
Subjectivity and Territoriality. In The SAGE Handbook of Political Geography, 
eds. K. R. Cox, M. Low and J. Robinson, 95-106. London: SAGE.
Ahmida, A., A. 2000. Introduction. In Beyond Nationalism and Colonialism in the Magrib, 
ed. A. Ahmida, A., 1-16. New York: Palgrave.
Amin, S. 1970. The Maghreb in the Modern World. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
———. 1974. Neo-Colonialism in West Africa. New York: Francis McDonagh.
———. 1977. Imperialism and Unequal Development. New York Monthly Press Review.
———. 1978. The Arab Nation. London: Zed Press.
Bahaijoub, A. 1993. Morocco's Argument to Join the EEC. In North Africa: Nation, State 
and Region, ed. G. Joffe, 235-246. New York: Routledge.
Bank, W. 1989. World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.
Barnett, M. 2000. Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States 
System. In State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, eds. T. Biersteker and C. 
Weber, 188-189. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Bennoune, M. 1977. Mauretania: Formation of a Neo-Colonial Society. Middle East 
Report 54 (26).
101
Bensadoun, M. 2007. The (Re)Fashioning of Moroccan National Identity. In The Maghrib 
in the New Century: Identity, Religion, Politics, eds. B. Maddy-Weitzman and D. 
Zisenwine, 13-35. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
Biersteker, T. 2002. State, Sovereignty and Territory. In Handbook of International 
Relations, eds. W. Carlesnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons, 157-176. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Blau, J. 1981. The Renaissance of Modern Hebrew and Modern Standard Arabic. 
Berkeley: Univerisity of California Press.
Blömstrom, M., and B. Hettne. 1984. Development Theory in Transition. London: Zed 
Books.
Boone, J. L., and N. L. Benco. 1999. Islamic Settlement in North Africa and the Iberian 
Peninsula. Annual Review of Anthropology 28:51-71.
Bowles, P. 2006. The Spider's House. New York: Harper Perennial.
Brace, R. M. 1964. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Brunschwig, H. 1966. French Colonialism 1871-1914: Myths and Realities. New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger.
Burke, E. I. 2000. Theorizing the Histories of Colonialism and Nationalism. In Beyond 
Colonialism and Nationalism in the Maghrib, ed. A. Ahmida, A. , 17-34. New 
York: Palgrave.
Carling, J. 2007. Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain. International Migration 45 
(4):3-36.
Césaire, A. 1989. Discours sur le Colonialisme. Paris: Présence Africaine.
Chatatou, M. 1993. The Present and Future of the Maghreb Arab Union. In North Africa:  
Nation, State and Region, ed. G. Joffe, 266-287. New York: Routledge.
Cohen, S., and L. Jaidi. 2006. Morocco: Globalization and Its Consequences. New York: 
Routledge.
Collyer, M. 2007. In-Between Places: Trans-Saharan Transit Migrants in Morocco and 
the Fragmented Journey to Europe. Antipode 39 (4):668-690.
Corbridge, S. 1993. Colonialism, Post-Colonialism and the Political Geography of the 
Third World. In Political Geography of the Twentieth Century, ed. P. Taylor, 171-
206. London: Bellhaven Press.
———. 2008. State and Society. In The SAGE Handbook of Political Geography, eds. K. 
R. Cox, M. Low and J. Robinson, 106-121. London: SAGE.
102
Cosgrove, D. 1985. Prospect, Perspective and the Evolution of the Landscape Idea. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 10 (1):45-62.
———. 1988. Geography is Everywhere: Culture and Symbolism in Human Landscapes. 
In Horizons in Human Geography, eds. D. Gregory and R. Walford, 118-135. 
Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books.
Cox, K. R., M. Low, and J. Robinson. 2008. Political Geography: Traditions and Turns. In 
The SAGE Handbook of Political Geography, eds. K. R. Cox, M. Low and J. 
Robinson, 1-14. London: SAGE.
Crain, M. M. 1999. New North African Immigration to Spain. Middle East Report 
(211):23-25.
Crawford, D. 2001. How "Berber" Matters in the Middle of Nowhere. Middle East Report 
(219):21-25.
Cypher, J., and J. Dietz. 1997. The Process of Economic Development. London: 
Routledge.
Dalby, S. 1998. Conclusion. In The Geopolitics Reader, eds. G. O Tuathail, S. Dalby and 
P. Routledge, 305-312. New York: Routledge.
———. 1999. Globalisation or Global Apartheid? In Boundaries, Territory and 
Postmodernity, ed. D. Newman, 132-150. London: Frank Cass.
———. 2003. Green Geopolitics. In A Companion to Political Geography, eds. J. Agnew, 
K. Mitchell and G. O' Tuathail, 440-454. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2008. Is Iran Next? The Importance of Geopolitics  2008 [cited 10/26 2008]. 
Available from http://www.e-ir.info/?p=513.
Davis, D. K. 2007. Resurrecting the Granary of Rome. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University 
Press.
de Haas, H. 2006. Migration, remittances and regional development in Southern 
Morocco. Geoforum 37 (4):565-580.
de Haas, H., and R. Plug. 2006. Cherishing the goose with the golden eggs: Trends in 
migrant remittances from Europe to Morocco 1970-2004. International Migration 
Review 40 (3):603-634.
Der Derian, J. 1998. All But War is Simulation. In Rethinking Geopolitics, 261-294. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Dicken, P. 2000. Globalization. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 315-317. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
103
Dodds, K. 2003. Cold War Geopolitics. In A Companion to Political Geography, eds. J. 
Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. O' Tuathail, 204-218. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Drakakis-Smith, D. 2000. Third World Cities. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
Fanon, F. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press.
Flint, C., and P. Taylor. 2007. Political Geography: World Economy, Nation-State and 
Locality. 5th ed. New York: Prentice Hall.
Frank, A. G. 1967. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: 
Monthly Press Review.
Friedmann, J. 1965. Venezuela: From Doctrine to Dialogue. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press.
———. 1966. Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
———. 1986. The World City Hypothesis. Development and Change 17:69-83.
———. 1996. Where We Stand: A Decade of World-City Research In World cities in a 
World System, eds. P. Knox and P. Taylor. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.
Gafaiti, H. 2003. Nationalism, Colonialism and Ethnic Discourse in the Construction of 
French Identity. In French Civilization and Its Discontents, eds. T. Stovall and G. 
Van Den Abbeele, 189-212. New York: Lexington Books.
Glissant, E. 2003. The French Language in the Face of Creolization. In French 
Civilization and Its Discontents, eds. T. Stovall and G. Van Den Abbeele, 105-
128. New York: Lexington Books.
Gold, P. 2000. Europe or Africa? A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African 
Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press.
Gramsci, A. 1977. Selections From Political Writings. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Grandguillame, G. 1997. Demagogues and Arabisers. Le Monde Diplomatique, 
February.
Gregory, D. 2000. Orientalism. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 566-567. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2000. Post-Colonialism. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. Johnston, 
D. Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 612-615. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
104
Haeri, N. 2000. Form and Ideology: Arabic Sociolinguistics and beyond. Annual Review 
of Anthropology 29:61-87.
Hakli, J. 1998. Manufacturing Provinces: Theorizing the Encounters Between 
Governmental and Popular 'Geographs' in Finland. In Rethinking Geopolitics, 
eds. G. O Tuathail and S. Dalby, 131-151. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Herb, G. 1999. National Identity and Territory. In Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory 
and Scale, eds. G. H. Herb and D. H. Kaplan. Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield.
Hoisington, W. A. 1995. Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco. New York: St. 
Martin's Press.
Hudson, B. 1977. The New Geography and the New Imperialism: 1870-1918. Antipode 9 
(1):12-18.
Huntington, S. P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. 
New Yorke: Simon and Schuster.
Hassan II, King of Morocco. 1978. The Challenge. London: Macmillan.
Jensen, E. 2005. Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate. Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener  
Publishers.
Kamal, R., and S. Moukaddem. 1998. The Arab World: Advance Amid Diversity. In The 
New Third World eds. A. Gonzalez and J. Norwine. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press.
Keller, R. C. 2007. Colonial Madness: Psychiatry in French North Africa. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Kenbib, M. 1993. The Impact of the French Conquest of Algeria on Morocco (1830-
1912). In North Africa: Nation, State and Region, ed. G. Joffe, 34-48. New York: 
Routledge.
Kollosov, V. 2003. After Empire. In A Companion to Political Geography, eds. J. Agnew, 
K. Mitchell and G. O Tuathail, 251-270. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Lalutte, P. 1976. Sahara: Notes Toward an Analysis. MERIP Reports (45):7-12.
Larrain, J. 1989. Theories of Development. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Lavenex, S. 2002. EU Trade Policy and Immigration Control In Migration and the 
Externalities of European Integration, eds. S. Lavenex and E. Ucarer, 161-177. 
Lanham, MD: Lexiington Books.
105
Lavenex, S., and E. Ucarer. 2002. The Emergent EU Migration Regime and its External 
Impact. In Migration and the Externalities of European Integration, eds. S. 
Lavenex and E. Ucarer. Oxford, UK: Lexington Press.
Lee, R. 2000a. Third World. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 827-829. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2000b. Core-Periphery Model. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. 
Johnston, D. Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 115-117. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2000c. Modernization In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 516-518. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2000d. Dependence. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 161-163. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Leveau, R. 1993. Reflections on the State in the Maghreb. In North Africa: Nation, State 
and Region, ed. G. Joffe, 247-265. London: Routledge.
Lewis, M. W., and K. E. Wigen. 1997. The Myth of Continents. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Liauzu, C. 2007. Dictionnaire de la Colonisation Française. Paris: Larousse.
MacMurray, D. 2006. Haddou: A Moroccan Migrant Worker. In Struggle and Survival in 
the Modern Middle East, eds. E. I. Burke and D. N. Yaghoubian, 281-300. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Maddy-Weitzman, B. 2007. Berber/Amazigh Memory Work. In The Maghrib in the New 
Century: Identity, Religion, Politics, eds. B. Maddy-Weitzman and D. Zisenwine, 
50-71. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
Maghroui, D. 2003. French Identity, Islam and North Africans. In French Civilization and 
Its Discontents, eds. T. Stovall and G. Van Den Abbeele, 213-234. Oxford, UK: 
Lexington Books.
Malgesini, G., and J. Hiltermann. 1993. Spain and the EC: Sluicegate for Europe's 
Migrant Labor Market. Middle East Report (181):25-29.
Marley, D. 2002. Diversity and Uniformity: Linguistic Fact and Fiction in Morocco. In 
French in and out of France: Language Policies, Intercultural Antagonisms and 
Dialogue, ed. K. Sahli, 335-376. Bern: Peter Lange.
———. 2004a. Language Attitudes in Morocco Following Recent Changes in Language 
Policy. Language Policy 3:25-46.
106
———. 2004b. The Evolution of a Postcolonial Role for French in Morocco. In Shifting 
Frontiers of France and Francophonie, eds. Y. Rocheron and C. Rolfe, 63-80. 
New York: Peter Lang.
McKean, E. 2005. Third Way. In Oxford American Dictionary, ed. E. McKean, 1754. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2005. Metropolitan, Metropole. In Oxford American Dictionary, ed. E. McKean, 
1068. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mitchell, D. 2000. Cultural Geography: A Critical Introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Mitchell, T. 1988. Colonizing Egypt. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mole, R. C. M., and J. Penrose. 2008. Nation-States and National Identity. In The SAGE 
Handbook of Political Geography, eds. K. R. Cox, M. Low and J. Robinson, 271-
283. London: SAGE.
Murphy, A. B. 1996. The Sovereign State as a Political-Territorial Ideal. In State 
Sovereignty as a Social Construct, eds. T. Biersteker and C. Weber, 81-120. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Murphy, C. 2008. Permanent Resistance in Western Sahara. Le Monde diplomatique, 
December.
Myers, G. 2008. Interview. Lawrence, Kansas, March 15, 2008.
Newman, D. 1999. Geopolitics Renaissant: Territory, Sovereinty and the World Political 
Map. In Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity, ed. D. Newman, 1-16. Portland, 
OR: Frank Cass.
O Tuathail, G. 1996. Critical Geopolitics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
———. 1998. Political geography III: dealing with deterritorialization. Progress in Human 
Geography 22 (1):81-93.
———. 1998. Thinking Critically About Geopolitics. In The Geopolitics Reader, 1-10. 
Routledge: New York.
O Tuathail, G., and J. Agnew. 1992. Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical 
Reasoning in American Foreign Policy. Political Geography Quarterly 11.
O Tuathail, G., and S. Dalby. 1998. Introduction. In Rethinking Geopolitics eds. G. O 
Tuathail and S. Dalby. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
O Tuathail, G., and T. Luke. 1994. Present at the (Dis)integration: Deterritorialization and 
Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order. Annals of the Association of  
American Geographers 84 (3):381-398.
107
Omar, N. 2007. Interview. Lawrence, Kansas, November 15, 2007.
Paasi, A. 1999. Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows. In 
Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity, ed. D. Newman, 69-88. London: Frank 
Cass.
———. 2008. Territory. In A Companion to Political Geography, eds. J. Agnew, K. 
Mitchell and G. O Tuathail, 109-122. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Painter, J. 2008. Geographies of Space and Power. In The SAGE Handbook of Political  
Geograpy, eds. K. R. Cox, M. Low and J. Robinson, 57-72. London: SAGE.
Pastore, F. 2002. Aeneas's Route: Euro-Mediterranean Relations and International 
Migration. In Migration and the Externalities of European Integration, 105-124. 
Oxford, UK: Lexington Press.
Peck, J., and A. Tickell. 2002. Neoliberalizing Space. Antipode 34 (3):380-404.
Peet, R. 1999. Theories of Development. New York: The Guilford Press.
Peet, R., and M. Watts. 1993. Environment and Development, Part I and II. Economic 
Geography 69 (3,4).
Pennell, C. R. 1993. Libya and Morocco: Consensus on the Past. In North Africa: 
Nation, State and Region, ed. G. Joffe, 203-220. New York Routledge.
———. 2000. Morocco Since 1830: A History. New York: New York University Press.
Pletsch, C. E. 1980. The Three Worlds, or the division of social scientific labor, circa 
1950-1975. Comparative Studies in Society and History 23:565-590.
Power, M. 2003. Rethinking Development Geographies. New York: Routledge.
Redouane, R. 1998. Arabisation in the Moroccan Educational System: Problems and 
Prospects. Language, Culture and Curriculum 11 (2):195-203.
Rekacewicz, P. 2000. A Political Look at Territory. Le Monde diplomatique - English 
Edition, May.
Rézette, R. 1975. The Western Sahara and the Frontiers of Morocco. Paris: Nouvelles 
Editions Latines.
Rivlin, P. 2007. The Constraints on Economic Development in Morocco and Tunisia, 
197-216. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
Robinson, J. 2002. City Futures: New Territories for Development Studies? In 
Development and Displacement, ed. J. Robinson, 141-204. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
108
Rostow, W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Routledge, P. 1995. Resisting and Reshaping the Modern. In Geographies of Global 
Change, eds. R. Johnston, P. Taylor and M. Watts. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2003. Anti-Geopolitics. In A Companion to Political Geography, eds. J. Agnew, 
K. Mitchell and G. O Tuathail, 236-248. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2008. Transnational Political Movements. In The SAGE Handbook of Political  
Geography, eds. K. R. Cox, M. Low and J. Robinson, 335-349. London: SAGE.
Rygiel, K. 1998. Stabilizing Borders: The Geopolitics of National Identity Construction in 
Turkey. In Rethinking Geopolitics, eds. G. O Tuathail and S. Dalby, 106-130. 
London: Routledge.
Sack, R. 1986. Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Said, E. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Random House.
———. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
———. 2004. Eloquent, Elegant Arabic. Le Monde diplomatique, August.
Sardar, Z. 1999. Orientalism. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
Sartre, J. P. 1963. Preface. In The Wretched of the Earth, ed. F. Fanon. New York: Grove 
Press.
Sassen, S. 2000. Regulating Immigration in a Global Age: A New Policy Landscape. 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 570:65-77.
Seddon, D. 2000. Dreams and Disappointments: Postcolonial Constructions of the 
Maghrib. In Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism in the Maghrib, ed. A. Ahmida, 
A., 197-231. New York: Palgrave.
Shakyrih, A. 2008. The Characteristcs and Distribution of Amazigh Languages in 
Morocco. Ifrane, Morocco, July 5.
Shurmer-Smith, P. 2002. Introduction. In Doing Cultural Geography, ed. P. Shurmer-
Smith, 1-8. London: SAGE.
———. 2002. The Trouble with Theory. In Doing Cultural Geography, ed. P. Shurmer-
Smith, 14-17. London: SAGE.
109
Silverstein, P., and D. Crawford. 2004. Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State. 
Middle East Report (233):44-48.
Slater, D. 1995. Trajectories of Development Theory. In Geographies of Global Change 
eds. R. Johnston, P. Taylor and M. Watts, 63-76. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2003. Geopolitical Themes and Postmodern Thought. In A Companion to 
Political Geography, eds. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. O Tuathail, 75-91. Malden, 
MA: Blackwell.
———. 2004. Geopolitics and the Post-colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Slavin, D. H. 1996. Heart of Darkness/Heart of Light: The Civilizing Mission in 
L'Atlantide. In Identity Papers: Contested Nationhood in Twentieth-Century 
France, eds. S. Ungar and T. Conley, 113-138. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press.
Smith, G. 2000. Nation-State. In Dictionary of Human Geography eds. R. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Smith, N. 1984. Uneven Development. New York: Basil Blackwell.
So, A. 1990. Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency and World-
Sytems Theories. London: SAGE.
Soja, E. 1968. The Geography of Modernization in Kenya: A Spatial Analysis of Social,  
Economic and Political Change. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Sparke, M., and V. Lawson. 2003. Entrepreneurial Geographies. In A Companion to 
Political Geography, eds. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. O Tuathail, 315-334. 
Malden, MA: 
Blackwell.
Spencer, C. 1993. The Spanish Protectorate and the Occupation of Tangier in 1940. In 
North Africa: Nation, State and Region, ed. G. Joffe, 91-107. London: Routledge.
Stork, J. 1990. Europe's Other Frontier: North Africa Faces the 1990s. Middle East  
Report (163):4-44.
Stork, J., and K. Pfeifer. 1987. Bullets, Banks and Bushels: The Struggle for Food in the 
Middle East. MERIP Middle East Report (145):3-6.
Stovall, T., and G. Van Den Abbeele. 2003. Introduction. In French Civilization and Its 
Discontents, eds. T. Stovall and G. Van Den Abbeele, 1-16. New York: Lexington 
Books.
110
Taylor, P. 1993. Political Geography: World Economy, Nation-State and Locality. 3rd ed. 
New York: John Wiley and Sons.
———. 1993 Introduction. In Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global 
Analysis, ed. P. Taylor, 1-6. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
———. 1994. The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World-System. 
Progress in Human Geography 2 (18):151-162.
———. 1995. Beyond Containers: Internationality, Interstateness, Interterritoriality. 
Progress in Human Geography 19 (1):1-15.
———. 2000a. Sovereignty. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 125, 126. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2000b. World Systems Analysis. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. 
Johnston, D. Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 901-903. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2000c. World Cities and Territorial States Under Conditions of Contemporary 
Globalization. Political Geography 19:5-32.
———. 2000d. Critical Geopolitics. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. 
Johnston, D. Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 16-128. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2003. Radical Political Geographies. In A Companion to Political Geography, 
eds. J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. O Tuathail, 47-58. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2004. World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis. New York: Routledge.
Vargas Llosa, M. 1998. The Notebooks of Don Rigoberto. New York: Farrar Straus and 
Giroux.
Wallerstein, I. 1974. The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press.
———. 2000a. Long Waves as Capitalist Process. In The Essential Wallerstein, ed. I. 
Wallerstein, 207-220. New York: The New Press.
———. 2000b. Modernization: Requiescat in Pace. In The Essential Wallerstein, ed. I. 
Wallerstein, 107-111. New York: The New Press.
Watts, M. 2000a. Colonialism. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 93-95. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2000b. Decolonization. In Dictionary of Human Geography, eds. R. Johnston, D. 
Gregory, G. Pratt and M. Watts, 153-155. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
111
Western, J. 2007. Neighbors or Strangers? Binational and Transnational Identities in 
Strasbourg. Annals of the AAG 1 (97):158-181.
White, G. 2001. Risking the Strait: Moroccan Labor Migration to Spain. Middle East  
Report (218):26-48.
White, G. W. 2007. Sovereignty and international labor migration: The 'security mentality' 
in Spanish-Moroccan relations as an assertion of sovereignty. Review of 
International Political Economy 14 (4):690-718.
Willis, K. 2005. Theories and Practices of Development. New York: Routledge.
Wright, G. 1991. The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
———. 1997. Tradition in the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism in French 
Colonial Policy, 1900-1930. In Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a 
Bourgeois World, eds. F. Cooper and L. A. Stoler, 323-345. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
Yacine, R. 1993. The Impact of the French Colonal Heritage on Language Policies in 
Independent North Africa. In North Africa: Nation, State and Region, ed. G. Joffe, 
221-232. New York: Routledge.
Zoubir, Y. H., and K. Benabdallah-Gambier. 2003. Western Saharan Deadlock. Middle 
East Report (227):8-11.
112
